Fraser of Allander Institute : Economic Commentary [February 2012] by Fraser of Allander Institute
Fraser of Allander Institute (2012) Fraser of Allander Institute : Economic 
Commentary [February 2012]. [Report] , 
This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/62032/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research 
outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the 
management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output.
Vol 35 No. 3 In association with
Fraser of Allander Institute
Economic Commentary
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
 
 
 
 
 
Fraser of 
Allander  
economic  
commentary 
February 2012 
Vol 35 No 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 University of Strathclyde, 2012 
 
The University of Strathclyde is a charitable body, registered in 
Scotland, number SC015263 
 
ISSN 2-46-5378 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outlook and appraisal ........................................................4 
 
The Scottish economy 
Forecasts of the Scottish economy ....................................22 
Review of Scottish Business Surveys ................................39 
Overview of the labour market............................................44 
Public sector employment in Scotland ................................53 
 
Economic perspectives 
Has there been an economic dividend from devolution? 
   Jo Armstrong, Richard Harris, John McLaren and  
   John Moffat......................................................................58 
 
Should housing benefit be devolved to Scotland? 
   Kenneth Gibb and Mark Stephens ..................................67 
 
 
FEBRUARY 2012 PAGE 1 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
PAGE 2 VOLUME 35  NUMBER 3 
The Fraser of Allander Economic Commentary was first 
published in 1975.  The new association between PwC and 
the University of Strathclyde’s Business School provides the 
Fraser of Allander Institute with the support to continue the 
Commentary, and we gratefully acknowledge this support.  
The Fraser of Allander Institute is a research unit within the 
Department of Economics at the University of Strathclyde in 
Glasgow.  The Institute carries out research on the Scottish 
economy, including the analysis of short-term movements in 
economic activity.  Its researchers have an international 
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Outlook 
and  
appraisal 
Overview 
 
 
 
The basic picture continues to be one of 
weak recovery with a further weakening 
apparent towards the end of 2011, as the UK 
economy contracted by 0.2%. Scottish GDP 
is still -3.3%% below the pre-recession peak 
nearly four years ago, while the figure for UK 
GVA is -3.6%. However, while the depth of 
the recession was greater in the UK, at  
-7.2%, than in Scotland, -5.9%, the recovery 
of UK GDP has been slightly faster than in 
Scotland. The National Institute in London 
has noted that the time taken in returning to 
the pre-recession peak is now greater than in 
the Great Depression in the 1930s. Our new 
forecast suggests that overall Scottish GDP 
will not return to its pre-recession peak - the 
level of GDP the economy was at just  before 
it went into recession - until the third quarter 
of 2014, just in time for the Commonwealth 
Games in Glasgow (23rd July to 3rd August 
2014). That is, six years after the recession 
began. 
 
The labour market in Scotland is now clearly 
weaker than the UK. Recent employment 
losses have taken the Scottish jobs market to 
a position 3.9% below its pre-recession 
employment peak. This is not that much 
different from the trough of the recession 
after employment had fallen by -4.8%. The 
UK jobs market is in contrast creating net 
jobs, all be it slowly and at an insufficient rate 
to stop unemployment rising. The result is 
that employment in the UK is now only  
-1.38% below its pre-recession employment 
peak. Of course that in itself is nothing to be 
complacent about since recession in the UK 
labour market began four years ago. 
Moreover, the situation in the Scottish labour 
market is worse than that implied by the 
employment figures. This is because the 
supply of labour is rising as working 
population increases. An examination of the 
amount of jobs on offer compared to the 
available labour supply reveals that the 
situation is now identical to the trough of the 
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recession. Hence unemployment has been 
rising strongly recently to 231,247 or 8.6% 
and above the UK rate of 8.4%. The number 
unemployed is very close to number reached 
at the trough of the recession in May-July 
2010 when unemployment reached 236,819. 
Within that total more than 100,000 young 
people are estimated to be unemployed. This 
is a personal and social tragedy, which on 
most people's values should produce the 
strongest policy response. Moreover, it is 
also an economic tragedy because of the risk 
that a generation of employees may lose, or 
fail to gain, key employment skills that would 
be of significant productive use to the 
economy. Potential output will fall. 
 
On a brighter note, the weakening in growth 
in the economy towards the end of last year 
does not appear to be as bad as many 
feared. There are some indications that 
growth is beginning to pick up and after a 
weak first six months growth may pick up 
towards the end of the year. The rate of 
inflation is falling as last year's VAT increase 
falls out of the statistic and the rise in import 
prices especially commodities and energy 
costs have moderated. Although the recent 
rise again in the price of oil to above $120 
per barrel, driven by events in Iran, leads one 
to be cautious about the prospect for a rapid 
fall in inflation. The mainstream view is that a 
lowering of the inflation rate back to target 
will give a relative boost to real incomes and 
so encourage a rise in household demand. 
But this view might be misplaced. If the 
pressing need of households is to pay down 
debt and present real incomes mean that 
there actual saving is below the 
precautionary saving desired to pay down 
debt. Then a rise in real income could lead to 
higher savings with little or no impact on 
household demand. Let us hope it is the 
former rather than the latter. 
 
The situation in the Eurozone remains the 
'elephant in the room' as regards future 
growth prospects but the problem has eased 
for two reasons. First, the agreement 
secured by EZ finance ministers on the 
much-postponed €130bn second bail-out for 
Greece. Secondly, the role the ECB has 
recently played in acting as de facto lender of 
last resort. By buying securities from EZ 
banks the banks have been able to use the 
increased liquidity to fund some of the debt 
of the peripheral sovereigns. These 
developments offer only temporary respite to 
the EZ balance of payments and debt crisis. 
But there is still a risk of a disorderly Greek 
default and exit from the EZ, which will put at 
risk some of the other sovereigns such as 
Portugal and Spain. Moreover, the balance 
of payments financing and adjustment issues 
have hardly been tackled even if some 
progress has been made on debt. 
 
Against this back ground we have revised 
down our forecast of GDP growth for 2012 to 
0.4% from 0.9%. But we expect growth to be 
a little stronger in 2013 at 1.7% instead of 
1.6%. By 2014 we predict a stronger 
recovery with growth of 2.6% taking us back 
to that pre-recession GDP peak by the third 
quarter. We expect Scottish growth to 
continue to be weaker than the UK but 
growth in the two jurisdictions is now 
expected to be much closer together, in line 
with the evidence from the recovery to date. 
 
For employment, our central forecast is for 
net jobs to fall by -1.8% in 2011, and by  
-0.7% in 2012, rising by 1.0% in 2013 and by 
1.7% in 2014. The number of employee jobs 
in Scotland is forecast to decline during 2012 
by just less than 16,000 jobs. Through 2013 
and 2014 we forecast increases in employee 
jobs in our central forecast, with annual 
increases of over 23 thousand and 38 
thousand respectively. There are job 
increases across all the main sectors. 
However, we forecast a “rebalancing” of 
employment within the service sectors 
towards non-public activities as fiscal 
consolidation continues. Construction 
employment is forecast to increase in 2013 
and 2014 as spending on (private) 
investment projects returns with renewed 
confidence in the recovery. 
 
Unemployment is forecast to continue to rise 
on both key measures this year. On the 
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Figure 1:  Scottish and UK Quarterly GDP Growth 
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Figure 2:  GVA in recession and recovery Scotland and UK to 2011q3 (Relative to pre-recession peak)  
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preferred ILO measure unemployment is 
predicted to reach 265,250 by the end of this 
year, or 9.8%. That is a rise of 34 thousand 
from the level reached at the end of 2011. As 
with our last forecast, we are expecting the 
unemployment position to improve through 
2013, and are now forecasting unemploy-
ment at the end of that year of 253,950, 
9.3%, falling further to 234,300, 8.8%, by the 
end of 2014. 
 
Recent GDP performance 
GDP grew by 0.5% in the third quarter identical to UK 
growth, compared to 0.2% in both the second and first 
quarters - see Figure 1. Over the year, GDP grew by less in 
Scotland, 0.9%, than in the UK 1.3%. It is also evident from 
Figure 1 that since the recession the Scottish economy has 
tracked the UK economy more closely than before. 
 
While this rate of growth is close to the trend rate of growth 
it is weak for the recovery phase of the business cycle. It is 
suggested by the National Institute for Economic and Social 
Research (NIESR), through their Director Jonathan Portes, 
that the time taken in returning to the pre-recession peak is 
now greater than in the Great Depression in the 1930s. 
 
Figure 2 shows that Scottish GVA now stands at -3.3% 
below the pre-recession peak nearly four years ago, while 
the figure for UK GVA is -3.6%. However, although the 
depth of the recession was greater in the UK, at -7.2%, than 
in Scotland, -5.9%, the recovery of UK GDP has been 
slightly faster than in Scotland. 
 
At the broad sectoral level, services (0.9%) and 
manufacturing (0.6%) were the main drivers of third quarter 
growth. Indeed, the Scottish performance was stronger than 
in UK services (0.7%) and UK manufacturing (0.1%).  
 
So, some comfort from a Scottish standpoint can be drawn 
from the latest data. But the performance of both services 
and manufacturing was weaker in Scotland over the year. 
The UK service sector grew by 1.2% over the year but 
Scottish services could only manage 0.3%. This underlines 
the weakness of the recovery in Scottish services, which is 
revealed in Figure 5. 
 
Despite experiencing a smaller drop in output in the 
recession of -4.7% compared to a fall of -5.4% in the UK 
service sector, Scottish services GVA was still -2.8% below 
its pre-recession peak compared to -1.8% in the UK. Figure 
6 charts recession and recovery in manufacturing. As with 
services the loss of output in recession was less than in the 
UK, but the recovery has been weak but comparable. GVA 
in manufacturing dropped by -10.1% in Scotland compared 
to -13.4% in the UK. In the most recent quarter manu-
facturing GVA in Scotland stood at -5.2% below its pre-
recession peak compared to -7.3% in the UK. A driver of the 
recovery in manufacturing is exports, which appears to have 
faltered in 2011. Manufacturing exports grew by 0.2 per cent 
in real terms during the third quarter of 2011. But this 
represented a weaker performance than the second quarter, 
which in turn was weaker than the first quarter. 
 
The construction sector was much weaker in Scotland in the 
third quarter contracting by -1.2% compared to an increase 
of 0.3% in the UK - see Figure 7. It is worth noting, though, 
that over the year the performance of Scottish construction 
was slightly better with growth of 5.9% compared to 5.4% in 
the UK. Figure 8 shows that the picture during the recession 
and recovery is more complicated. The drop in output in the 
recession was large and identical in Scotland and the UK at 
-18.3%. But Scottish construction bounced back more 
strongly than its UK counterpart, then contracted for 4 
successive quarters, while UK construction contracted for 2 
quarters and then grew over the last 2 quarters. The result 
was that by 2011q3, construction GVA in Scotland and the 
UK was broadly in the same place in relation to its pre-
recession peak, at -6.9%. 
 
Within services, the most important sector by contribution to 
GDP, business and financial services - 26% of overall GDP 
and 36% of service sector GVA - grew by 2.3% in Scotland 
and 1.2% in the UK during the latest quarter. However, over 
the year the sector contracted by -0.3% in Scotland but 
grew by 1.9% in the UK. Figure 9 shows the path of GVA in 
the sector during the recession and recovery relative to its 
pre-recession peak. What is clear from the chart is the 
greater recession in Scotland and weaker recovery. GVA fell 
by -7.0% in UK business and financial services during the 
recession whereas in Scotland the contraction was -9.8%. 
By the latest quarter the sector in the UK was -3.2% below 
its pre-recession peak while its Scottish counterpart was  
-6.5% below, which is not much different from the trough of 
the recession in the sector in the UK. Elsewhere in services 
Distribution, Hotels and Catering grew more quickly in 
Scotland in both the recent quarter and over the year. 
Growth was 0.7% in the quarter compared to 0.2% in the 
UK, while over the year the Scottish sector grew by 2.6% 
while its UK counterpart grew by 0.3%. In contrast, both 
Transport, Storage, Information & Communication and 
Government & Other Services grew more quickly in the UK. 
The Transport et al sector contracted by -0.3% in the 
quarter while the sector in the UK grew by 0.3%. Over the 
year, the sector contracted by -0.8% in Scotland while 
expanding by 1.3% in the UK. Similarly, in the government & 
other services sector growth was flat in the quarter but was 
positive at 0.6% in the UK. Over the year, the sector was 
largely stagnant in Scotland with growth of only 0.1% but 
exhibited growth of 1% in the UK. These slower rates of 
growth of government activity are likely in part to reflect the 
strengthening of the programme of fiscal consolidation.  
 
For analysis of developments within manufacturing, we only 
have data on the Scottish economy. There are currently no 
UK figures on a directly comparable basis. That said, the  
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Figure 3:  Scottish and UK Services GVA Growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2011q3 
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Figure 4:  Scottish and UK Manufacturing GVA Growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2011q3 
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Figure 5:  Services: Recession and Recovery to 2011q3 
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Figure 6:  Manufacturing: Recession and Recovery to 2011q3  
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Figure 7:  Scottish and UK Construction GVA Volume Growth 1998q2 - 2011q3 
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main sectors driving manufacturing growth of 0.9% in the 
third quarter were Engineering & Allied and Food & Drink, 
with growth of 1% and 1.9%, respectively. The Metals sector 
grew strongly with GVA rising by 3% during the quarter. 
However, metals accounts for half the weight of the other 
two sectors. Most of the main manufacturing sectors grew 
quite strongly over the year, which hopefully augurs well for 
future growth. Figure 10 shows the growth performance of 
manufacturing exports over the past eight years. The 
quarterly data are smoothed as a four-quarter moving 
average to remove some of the quarterly fluctuations to 
which the series is prone, in part because of the 'lumpy' 
nature of export orders and sales (The series is already 
seasonally adjusted.) Recovery from recession is clearly 
evident but the faltering nature of the recovery is also clear. 
 
The labour market 
The latest labour market data for the Scottish economy were 
not encouraging. However, the picture for the UK labour 
market was a little brighter. Unemployment (on the preferred 
ILO measure) rose during the final quarter of 2011 by 
16,000 to 231,247 or 8.6%, higher than the UK rate of 8.4%. 
This figure is close to the recession peak of unemployment 
in May-July 2010 when unemployment reached 236,819. 
For a detailed consideration of the Scottish labour market 
see Overview of the Labour Market in this Commentary 
below. 
 
Employment fell by 20,000 to take the Scottish jobs market 
to a position 3.9% below its pre-recession employment peak 
- see Figure 11. This is not that much different from the 
trough of the recession after employment had fallen by  
-4.8%. The position in the UK on the jobs front is better, 
however. Net jobs were created during Oct-Dec, by 60,000 
even though unemployment rose by 48,000. The inactivity 
rate also fell quite markedly in the UK whereas in Scotland 
there was only a slight fall.  
 
All this suggests that with more encouraging data on the 
output front, the UK labour market might be beginning to 
turn round although unemployment may rise for a little while 
yet. This does not disguise the fact that unemployment 
remains high by historical standards. Jonathan Portes, 
Director of NIESR, demonstrates that the 'unemployment 
gap' between actual unemployment and the rate of 
unemployment that is estimated to be associated with non-
accelerating inflation is exceptionally high and of long 
duration by historical standards. The 'unemployment gap' if 
positive indicates the amount of unemployment due to a 
deficiency of demand and hence a failure of macro-
economic management. With a large element of this gap 
being made up of 'youth' unemployment - more than 
100,000 estimated in Scotland - the risk of hysteresis, with a 
generation of employees losing, or failing to gain, key 
employment skills, is high. 
 
In Scotland, the labour market is now clearly weaker than 
the UK. There is no better indicator of this than a 
comparison of the amount of employment on offer with the 
available labour supply. As Figure 12 reveals the amount of 
jobs on offer compared to the available labour supply is now 
identical to the trough of the recession. 
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Figure 8: Construction: Recession and Recovery to 2011q3  
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Given that the growth of output remains weak it is likely that 
unemployment will continue to rise in Scotland for some 
time yet. Moreover, Scotland's position compared to the 
other regions of the UK, which has also been weakening, 
may continue to worsen - see Figure 13. 
 
Re-balancing the Scottish economy 
The shock to the economy of the Great Recession 
continues to reverberate. Not only has the recovery been 
weak, there are fears that a large proportion of supply has 
been permanently lost, and that there has been a desired 
permanent shift in the composition of demand away from 
one set of productive activities to another set. There are 
activities such as investment banking, containing both 
tradable and non-tradable elements - see below, which it is 
arguable have been permanently reduced in the UK 
following the boom and slump. In general terms, the IMF 
has found that downturns associated with significant 
disruption to the financial sector are often characterised by 
large and persistent output losses1. 
  
On the demand-side, Ben Broadbent – External Member of 
the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) - 
has argued that the large fall in sterling in 2007-08 
“...reflects the need to rebalance UK supply – away from 
non traded goods and services, and towards the production 
of tradables – in order to match an equivalent shift in the 
composition of demand”2. Broadbent's argument is that first, 
debt financed spending on housing, in particular, and 
perhaps other forms of property, has fallen for the 
foreseeable future. In addition, the loss of tax revenues as a 
result of the recession has been significant. Broadbent 
points out that tax revenues in 2009-10 were £109bn lower 
than expected in early 2007, equal to almost a third of 
current government spending on public services. The  
government has started a major and seemingly permanent 
cutback in government consumption, rightly or wrongly, as a 
result of the loss of tax revenues and rising debt. The main 
impact of this lowered spending will be on the demand for 
non-tradables. While in the short-to-medium term the 
government sees switching from public to private demand, 
household to export demand, and consumption to 
investment demand, there is a sense that, in the longer 
term, the required sustained switch is one from non-
tradables to tradables. Exports, in particular, will have to 
play a greater role in the growth of both UK and Scottish 
economies. 
 
To the extent this argument is correct, the future course of 
the economy i.e. growth and its composition, will depend on 
how successful and how quickly the economy can adjust 
away from the non-tradable activities that are less in 
demand towards tradable activities. And the most important 
tradable activities are manufacturing and tradable business 
and financial services. 
. 
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Figure 9:  Business & Financial Services: Recession and Recovery to 2011q3 
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Figure 10:  Scottish Manufacturing Export Growth 2003 to 2011 - Percent, four quarter moving average  
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Figure 11:  Scottish and UK jobs, 16 and over, compared to pre-recession peak 
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Figure 12:  Scottish Employment to Working Population ratio compared to pre-recession peak in April-June 
2007 to Oct-Dec 2011  
 
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
Apr ?Jun
2007
Jul ?Sep
2007
Oct ?Dec
2007
Jan ?Mar
2008
Apr ?Jun
2008
Jul ?Sep
2008
Oct ?Dec
2008
Jan ?Mar
2009
Apr ?Jun
2009
Jul ?Sep
2009
Oct ?Dec
2009
Jan ?Mar
2010
Apr ?Jun
2010
Jul ?Sep
2010
Oct ?Dec
2010
Jan ?Mar
2011
Apr ?Jun
2011
Jul ?Sep
2011
Oct ?Dec
2011
 ?6.35%  ?6.35%
 
FEBRUARY 2012 PAGE 13 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
All this begs several questions when it comes to Scotland. 
First, what evidence is there on changes in the demand and 
supply for non-tradables and tradables as a consequence of 
the recession in Scotland, both absolutely and relative to the 
rest of the UK? Secondly, what are the prospects for the 
growth of the Scottish tradables sector in the medium to 
long-term? 
 
Data are limited but we do have the latest ONS Regional 
activity data that were published in mid December. The 
Regional Accounts data provide information on sectoral 
GVA up to 2009 and overall 'regional' GVA to 2010. Figure 
14 shows the sectoral GVA shares before - 2007 - and 
during/after the recession - 2009 -  in Scotland. 
 
Figure 14 offers some support for the view that switching 
between non-tradables and tradables began during the 
recession. Of the typical non-tradable sectors, construction's 
share of Scottish GVA dropped from 9.1% to 7.4%, 
wholesale and retail etc, dropped marginally from 10.1% to 
10%, real estate activities fell from 7.5% to 6.5%, and 
transportation and storage reduced its share from 5% to 
4.8%. However, public sector activities that embrace the 
three sectors, Human health etc, Education, and Public 
Administration etc., increased their share of GVA slightly 
between 2007 and 2009 from 21.3% to 22.8%. The rise in 
public non-tradable activities would appear to be the 
inevitable initial consequence of a private sector recession. 
The government maintained its own demand in the 
recession as it traditionally now does. But once fiscal 
consolidation finally works through then it is likely that the 
share of public sector activities will fall. 
 
Turning now to the largely tradable activities, there is some 
suggestion of rising GVA shares, although by 2009 the 
increase was small. Manufacturing's share of overall GVA 
rose from 11.5% to 11.9% and this despite a large drop in 
real manufacturing GVA as measured by the Scottish 
government's own GVA index. Also, the share of financial 
services and insurance in overall GVA rose from 7.1% to 
9%. This is in many respects surprising, given the source of 
the recession in a banking crisis, where one might have 
expected demand to fall disproportionately in financial 
services and perhaps even some supply to have been lost. 
The rise in the share might indicate that the effects of a 
relative price shift in demand towards tradable elements of 
financial services outweighed the income effect in reducing 
demand but I doubt it. What needs to be allowed for is the 
extent to which the sector was able to maintain and increase 
its 'market' share by raising prices. It is possible that the lack 
of competition in the sector, particularly in areas such as 
business finance, enabled this to happen. It certainly chimes 
with anecdotal evidence about the behaviour of the banks 
during and after the recession in terms of charges for new 
lending and re-financing. Moreover, the rise in the share of 
financial services following the recession was not simply a 
Scottish phenomenon and was evident right across the UK 
as Figure 15 shows. 
 
In contrast, the rise in the share of manufacturing in overall 
GVA was much more a Scottish phenomenon. Indeed, as 
Figure 16 shows, the share of manufacturing in UK GVA fell 
between 2007 and 2009, from 11% to 10.3%. 
 
Only in Scotland and Northern Ireland did the manufacturing 
share of GVA rise. But in regions such as the North East 
and the West Midlands, the drop in the manufacturing share 
was large from 15.3% to 13.2% in the former and 14.6% to 
12.8% in the latter. 
 
So, we have tried to offer some answers to our first 
question: what evidence is there on changes in the demand 
and supply for non-tradables and tradables as a 
consequence of the recession in Scotland, both absolutely 
and relative to the rest of the UK? The evidence appears to 
show that a shift in demand away from non-tradables 
towards tradables has occurred. However, there is clear 
evidence of a relative fall in some non-tradable sectors but 
weaker evidence of a relative rise in sectors considered to 
be largely tradable. The picture appears also to be confused 
by the income effect of the recession, which caused 
demand to fall for all goods and services, although the 
incidence of the drop in demand varied across sectors. 
What we can say is that manufacturing, the principal traded 
sector, held up relatively well in Scotland. This could mean 
that, in answer to our second question, the Scottish 
economy may be well placed to take advantage of the 
expected sustained switch in demand in favour of tradables 
in the future. 
  
However, the prospects depend on the supply response of 
the Scottish economy. That is, how easily the economy 
allows existing resources to switch from non-tradable 
activities in reduced demand, along with the allocation of 
new resources, to manufacturing. We saw above that while 
manufacturing exports from Scotland are recovering the 
recovery to date is fitful.  
 
We have undertaken a detailed analysis of Scottish exports 
over the past 10 years using data from the recently 
published Global Connections Survey, the Index of 
Manufacturing Exports, and the Scottish Input-Output 
tables. Some of the results from this exercise are presented 
in Box 1 of the Forecasts of the Scottish economy section in 
this Commentary below. What this analysis suggests, in 
broad terms, is that the rest of the UK (RUK) became more 
important as an export destination and service sector 
exports rose as a proportion of total exports and so 
increased in importance relative to manufacturing. However, 
these findings need to be hedged with one or two 
qualifications.  
 
First, the growth in importance of RUK exports as a 
proportion of total exports reflected the strong growth in 
service and financial service sector exports up to 2007 just 
prior to the start of the recession. Between 2008 and 2010, 
the annual rate of growth of total exports declined 
considerably from the period 2002 to 2007. This was very  
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Figure 13:  Unemployment rate % (ILO measure) UK Regions Oct-Dec 2011 
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much the result of a drop in exports to RUK, which fell from 
9.9% per annum to 0.6% per annum, still managing some 
positive growth3. Exports to the rest of the world (ROW), in 
contrast, went from -0.5% annual growth in 2002-07 to -
0.6% in 2008-10, i.e. they were falling over the whole 
period. 
 
Secondly, we cannot get a proper appreciation of the 
underlying performance of manufacturing exports and 
contribution to exports as a whole, unless we remove the 
electronics sector. Because of the world-wide recession in 
ICT in 2000 and thereafter, electronics production in 
Scotland halved and the sector's contribution to exports fell 
considerably. With the removal of electronics, the annual 
growth rate of manufacturing exports to RUK pre-recession 
and then during recession falls from 4.0% per annum to 
1.4%. Over the same period service sector exports to RUK 
fell from 13.4% per annum to -0.9%. So exports of 
manufactures (ex electronics), and manufacturing overall, to 
RUK held up better than service exports. Moreover, 
manufacturing (ex electronics) exports to ROW were 
growing quite strongly in the pre-recession period by 4.4% 
per annum but less than service exports to ROW, which 
grew strongly by 8.9% per annum. In the recession 
manufacturing exports (ex electronics) fell to -1.4% per 
annum while service exports to ROW although contracting 
considerably managed to record some positive growth of 
1.4% per annum. 
So, we can conclude by making the following points:  
 
x It appears likely that the future growth of the 
Scottish economy will depend more on tradables 
than non-tradables than it has done in the past. 
Policy needs to recognise this. Although, recent 
evidence suggests that the rebalancing process is 
already underway.  
 
x The growing importance of tradable service exports 
suggests that export promotion policies should not 
simply assume that manufacturing is the only 
source of strong export growth.  
 
x Equally, the weak performance of Scottish exports 
to the ROW and the weak performance of 
manufacturing exports within that total, should not 
produce a counsel of despair. 
 
x The weak Scottish export performance to ROW 
over the past 8 to 10 years is mainly down to the 
significant loss of electronics production at the 
beginning of the period and the effects of recession 
at the end of the period.  
 
x Policy needs to recognise the importance of the 
RUK market as a legitimate target for 'export' 
promotion policy.  
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Figure 14:  Sectoral Shares (%) of Scottish GVA: 2007 and 2009  
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Figure 15: Financial Sector GVA Shares in UK Regions before and in recession, 2007 and 2009  
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Figure 16:  Manufacturing GVA Shares UK Regions 2007 and 2009  
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x However, the continuing weakness of UK 
household demand might also suggest that the 
recent shift in the balance of exports in favour of 
the rest of the UK could hamper the necessary 
rebalancing of Scottish industry in favour of the 
production of tradables and exports. 
 
Forecasts 
 
Background 
Real GDP in the UK economy contracted by 0.2% in the 
final three months of last year. A key question is whether 
this fall in GDP is a portent of worse to come, or will this 
weakening in an already weak recovery be temporary? The 
question cannot be answered with much certainty. As we 
noted above GDP is around 4% below its pre-recession 
peak. It is the production sector and construction that is 
displaying the greatest weakness, with manufacturing  
(-0.9% in the quarter) contributing most to the decline, while 
the service sector slowly recovers. But mining and quarrying 
also contracted by -1.1% in the quarter and the ONS cites 
the drop in North Sea Oil production as a key factor. Indeed, 
the sustained weakness of oil production in the UK is shown 
to be a contributory factor in the weakening UK trade 
position. The near term prospects for production output, 
which contributes 15% to overall UK GDP do not look 
promising. Most of the broad product groupings are either 
exhibiting a downward trend or flat growth. Moreover, both 
consumer durable and non-durables are contributing little to 
growth, with no sign of an upturn. This clearly reflects the 
state of UK consumer demand as households continue to 
pay down debt and deal with declining real incomes. 
 
The situation in services in the UK is a little more 
reassuring. The performance of business services & finance 
is encouraging and should support future growth. But with 
fiscal consolidation beginning to bite the still positive 
contribution to growth from Government & other services 
might be expected to diminish.  
 
We noted above that the recovery was meant to be based 
on a switch from domestic to external sales, from 
consumption to investment, and from public to private 
activity. There is little evidence of this occurring much in the 
latest statistics. What the outturn data suggest is that we 
might expect to see more negative GDP growth in the UK in 
the first half of this year, or at best stagnation. But it is not all 
gloom. Net jobs are being created in the UK labour market 
even though unemployment and particularly youth 
unemployment is unforgivably high. The rate of inflation is 
falling as last year's VAT increase falls out of the statistic 
and the rise in import prices especially commodities and 
energy costs have moderated. Although the recent rise 
again in the price of oil to above $120 per barrel, driven by 
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events in Iran, leads one to be cautious about the prospect 
for a rapid fall in inflation. Moreover, while the mainstream 
view is that a fall in the inflation rate back to target will give a 
relative boost to real incomes and so encourage a rise in 
household demand, the view might be misplaced. If the 
pressing need of households is to pay down debt and 
present real incomes mean that there actual saving is below 
the precautionary saving desired to pay down debt. Then a 
rise in real income could lead to higher savings with little or 
no impact on household demand. Nevertheless, if this is any 
comfort, the latest Markit Household Finance Index shows 
household finances still worsening but deteriorating at their 
slowest rate since December 2010. The survey also 
suggests that household debt may have stabilised, which I 
assume means has stopped rising. 
 
Other UK survey evidence is a little more encouraging. The 
Markit/CIPS UK Services PMI showed that UK service 
sector growth improved in January to the strongest level 
since March last year. New orders were up and business 
orders rose considerably leading Markit's Chief Economist 
Chris Williamson to comment that "... (t)he surprisingly 
strong upturn in the service sector follows a similar 
improvement in manufacturing and ongoing growth in 
construction, which all points to a resounding revival of UK 
economic growth in January. The situation is certainly a lot 
brighter than seen in the final quarter of last year, when the 
economy contracted 0.2%, and a slide back into recession 
is now looking increasingly unlikely." 
 
However, we would still argue that the scale and speed of 
the UK Coalition's fiscal austerity programme is a mistake, 
and that there is sufficient 'fiscal capacity' to slow the 
process down. We are not alone in this view. For example, 
the Oxford macro-economist Simon Wren Lewis argues that 
"the speed of fiscal tightening  .... is too rapid. In the UK in 
2010, for example, there was a clear risk that private sector 
demand would not pick up in 2011. The risk coming from the 
Eurozone was also apparent. In these circumstances, the 
prudent policy option was not to scale back public spending 
too rapidly, because there was no insurance policy in place 
if these risks materialised. They did materialise, and UK 
growth stalled. The Eurozone is making exactly the same 
mistake, in perhaps a bigger way." 4
 Wren Lewis then 
comments on the risks of rising debt and loss of market 
confidence "(O)ne simple point is worth making again and 
again. If the recession reflects additional net saving by the 
private sector, they want to hold more assets. Furthermore, 
given the character of the recession, they want to hold 
relatively safe assets. There is a literature on the current 
shortage of safe assets. Budget deficits provide those 
assets, but still interest rates on debt are falling outside the 
Eurozone because there are not enough of them. This too 
points to budget deficits being cut too quickly."5 
 
The so-called 'elephant in the room' remains the situation in 
the Eurozone (EZ). On Tuesday 21st February, the EZ 
finance ministers secured agreement on a much-postponed 
€130bn second bail-out for Greece. This was secured after 
private holders of Greek bonds were cajoled into taking a 
greater loss of 53.5 per cent on the face value of their bond 
holdings compared to the 50 per cent agreed in October. In 
net present value terms the size of the 'haircut' amounts to a 
loss of 70%. The revised arrangements followed a report 
prepared for the EZ finance ministers which suggested that 
the current proposal would on a 'downside scenario' be 
likely to result in a Greek debt to GDP ratio 160 per cent by 
2020 instead of the desired 120 per cent. The figure of 120 
per cent is considered to be the maximum level that would 
make the Greek public finances sustainable. All the i's have 
not been dotted nor the t's crossed on the deal, so it could 
yet collapse.  
 
Moreover, one reason why the report considered that the 
previous proposal would not get the debt ratio to 120 per 
cent was the effect of austerity in lowering Greek GDP. This 
problem still remains and many economists believe that 
there is little likelihood of Greece getting on to a sustainable 
public finance track under the present strict austerity 
conditions required by the EZ. A disorderly default continues 
to have a high probability. In addition, it is very unlikely that 
austerity and the use of demand reduction to force an 
internal devaluation to improve Greek competitiveness will 
work at all. So, even if financing is delivered in the short-to 
medium term, the problem will return because of the lack of 
adjustment in the competitiveness of the Greek economy. 
Another reason why a Greek exit from the EZ has a high 
probability. Despite these caveats, the markets have given 
the EZ the benefit of the doubt and yields on the main 
peripheral country bonds have fallen over the last few 
weeks, helped considerably by the ECB's significant 
injection of liquidity into the banking system. The ECB has 
de facto been acting as a lender of last resort, with the 
banks using the increased liquidity to fund some of the debt 
of the peripheral sovereigns. The problems posed by the EZ 
member country balance of payments and debt crisis have 
eased, for the moment. 
 
Yet growth continues to be weak in the EZ and this amongst 
other factors is affecting growth in the Scottish economy. 
We noted in the previous Commentary that more than half 
of Scotland's exports outside the UK are to EU economies 
mostly within the EZ. In the present Commentary below in 
the section on the Forecasts of the Scottish Economy a 
weak growth forecast for the EZ is noted as well as the 
downside risk: a central forecast of 0% in 2012 and 1.4% in 
2013, with the downside scenario a forecast of -2.1% in 
2012 and -1.2% in 2013. It is noted that this is a remarkable 
range (2.6 percentage points in absolute terms) between the 
alternative scenarios at such a forecast horizon, and clearly 
highlights the risk to growth in the EZ if there is a major 
deterioration in the financial crisis. 
 
Scotland cannot help being touched by weak household 
spending in the rest of the UK as well as the deteriorating 
conditions in the EZ. Currently household spending in 
Scotland remains very weak, with wages increasing at 
below previous rates and a continued high rate of household 
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The prospects for Scottish exports remain very uncertain. 
Growth prospects in the rest of the UK – Scotland’s largest 
export market – remain low. Scottish export prospects to the 
rest of the UK are strongly correlated with UK economic 
growth, so weak growth is likely to be bad for Scottish 
exports. Yet as the latest data from the CPB Netherlands 
Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis show the growth of 
world trade may be picking up again after slowing for much 
of last year. But given that 67% of Scottish exports go to the 
rest of the UK it what happens to the growth of income there 
that really matters. 
savings. Prospects for investment growth in Scotland 
through the first half of 2012 also appear weak. For example 
the data on the growth of inventories growth in the UK 
suggests a lower rate of stock building in key sectors. 
Government resource (current) spending is forecast to 
reduce in real terms over the next three years at an 
increasing rate as departmental cuts outlined in the CSR 
from Autumn 2010 are implemented. The IFS in January 
2012 outlined that some 88% of planned DEL reductions 
have yet to be implemented. This will continue to exert a 
downward pressure on domestic demand. Moreover, the 
data appear to suggest that government spending has fallen 
faster in real terms in Scotland than in the UK as a whole. 
 
Some light on the most recent performance of the Scottish 
 
 
Table 1:  Forecast Scottish GVA Growth, 2011-2014  
 
GVA Growth (% per annum) 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 
Central forecast 0.7 0.4 1.7 
 
2.6 
November forecast 0.4 0.9 1.6  na 
 
UK median independent new (February) 
 
Mean Absolute Error % points 
 
 
0.9 
 
+/- 0.153 
 
 
0.5 
 
+/- 0.548 
 
 
1.8 
 
+/- 1.216                   
 
 
 
 
Table 1 shows that we have revised our forecast for all 
years. For 2011, we have raised our forecast from 0.4% to 
0.7%. The increase in output measured for the third quarter 
of 2011 was stronger than we expected (a 0.5% increase), 
and broadly tracked the UK growth in that quarter. This 
upwards revision has brought our forecast in line with our 
earlier forecast from June 2011, where we forecast 0.8% 
growth during 2011. In March 2011 we had forecast annual 
growth of 1.0% in 2011. Our forecast of 0.4% for 2012 is not 
inconsistent with one, or possibly two, quarters of negative 
through 2012. Indeed, we note that the Bank of England’s 
Governor, Mervyn King, had remarked on the possibility of a 
“zigzagging” phase for growth over the coming year. 
Continuing weakness in household consumption and 
investment are the key reasons for the downward revision. 
In November 2011, we forecast growth in 2013 of 1.6%, so 
our latest forecast is revised up slightly. This is the first 
instance that we have forecast growth in 2014. By then a 
significant recovery is expected to be present, with growth 
above trend. 
economy can be shed from survey data - see Review of 
Business Surveys section below. Surveys of Scottish 
business up to January continued to highlight concerns 
about the implications of the sovereign debt crisis in the EZ. 
Business confidence was also dampened by continuing 
fears of recession in the UK and internationally, and fears 
about pressures on household spending.  However, the 
surveys since January particularly the UK wide surveys 
suggest that activity, may be beginning to pick up. We noted 
above the findings of the UK PMI for January which reported 
an increase in the service sector, at the fastest rate since 
March 2011. What remains unclear is whether this 
represents only a temporary improvement, as was the case 
last year in the first quarter which faded later in the year as 
the headwinds facing the UK economy became clearer, or 
represents the first signs of a more permanent upward 
trend. 
 
GVA Forecasts 
For our latest GVA forecasts we continue the presentational 
procedure adopted in the previous Commentary. We 
present only a central forecast but use estimated forecast 
errors to establish the likely range that the true first estimate 
of the growth of Scottish GVA will lie between. In this 
forecast, we extend the forecast horizon to include 2014 
 
Our GVA forecasts are compared with the median of latest 
independent  forecasts for the UK in 2011, 2012 and 2013 
that are published by the UK Treasury. These show that we 
expect Scottish growth to continue to be weaker than the 
UK but growth in the two jurisdictions is now expected to be 
much closer together, in line with the evidence from the 
recovery to date. 
 
Table 1 presents our forecasts for Scottish GVA - GDP at 
basic prices - for 2011 to 2014. The forecasts are presented 
in more detail in the Forecasts of the Scottish Economy 
section of this Commentary below. 
 
 
 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
Table 2: Forecast Scottish Net Jobs Growth in Three Scenarios, 2011-2014 
 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 
Upper 
 
-37,377        
 
-4,816 
 
47,244 
 
63,745 
 
November forecast 
 
11,150 
 
18,850 
 
41,100 
  
 
Central  
 
-40,401         
 
-15,988       
 
23,213 
 
38,023 
 
November forecast 
 
4,900 
 
8,750 
 
16,200 
  
 
Lower 
 
-43,437           
 
-27,695      
 
-1,853 
 
12,126 
November forecast -1,550 -1,350 -9,250   
 
 
 
Table 3:  ILO unemployment rate and claimant count rate measures of unemployment under each of the 
three forecast scenarios 2011-2014 
 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 
ILO unemployment 
   Rate (ILO un/TEA 16+) 8.6% 9.8% 9.3% 8.8% 
Numbers  231,200 265,250 253,950 234,300 
     
Claimant count      
    Rate (CC/CC+total job) 5.3% 6.1% 6.5% 6.1% 
Numbers   141,500  164,450  177,750  166,350 
 
 
So, we are now forecasting growth of 0.7% in 2011, 0.4% in 
2012, 1.7% in 2013, and 2.6% in 2014. Given our previous 
forecast errors the lower and upper bounds for growth in 
2011 are expected to be 0.5% and 0.9%. for 2012, -0.1% 
and 0.9%, and for 2013, 0.5% and 2.9%.  
 
Production and manufacturing output are projected to 
continue to be the main sectoral drivers of growth, with 
Production forecast to grow by 1% this year compared to 
service sector and construction growth of 0.3% which are  
largely flat-lining. In 2013, production continues to be the 
main sectoral driver of growth with growth of 4%. Stronger 
growth is projected for services and construction of 1.1% 
apiece but the two sectors will still be recovering slowly. It is 
not until 2014 that we see much pick-up in growth, a year 
later than previously forecast. GDP is forecast to rise by 
2.6%, while production growth rises appreciably to 6%, 
service sector growth moves up to 1.9% and the growth of 
construction GVA reaches 1.7%. 
 
One significant implication of these GVA forecasts is that 
they suggest that overall Scottish GDP will not return to its 
pre-recession peak - the level of GDP the economy was at 
just  before it went into recession - until the third quarter of 
2014, just in time for the Commonwealth Games in Glasgow 
(23rd July to 3rd August 2014). That is, six years after the 
recession began. 
 
 
Employment Forecasts 
Table 2 presents our forecasts for net employee jobs for the 
4 years 2011 to 2014 in terms of a central and upper and 
lower forecasts. 
 
Table 2 indicates that our year-end employee jobs forecast 
have been reduced further from the forecasts presented in 
the November Commentary. The lower forecasts reflect the 
weaker than expected outcomes in the labour market in the 
final quarter of last year, data revisions and the reduced 
forecast for GVA in 2012. On the central forecast, net jobs 
grow by -1.8% in 2011, -0.7% in 2012, 1.0% in 2013 and by 
1.7% in 2014. The number of employee jobs in Scotland is 
forecast to decline during 2012 by just less than 16,000 
jobs. Within the sectors, however, we are forecasting a 
reduction in jobs in the service sectors of over sixteen 
thousand jobs. Public sector reductions in employee jobs 
are forecast to be around 7 thousand over the year. We are 
also forecasting reductions in jobs in Retail and Wholesale 
but increases in employment in the Business Services 
sector. Through 2013 and 2014 we forecast increases in 
employee jobs in our central forecast, with annual increases 
of over 23 thousand and 38 thousand respectively. There 
are job increases across all the main sectors. However, as 
in 2012 we forecast a “rebalancing” of employment within 
the services sectors towards non-public activities as fiscal 
consolidation continues. Construction employment is 
forecast to increase in 2013 and 2014 as spending on 
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(private) investment projects returns with renewed 
confidence in the recovery. 
 
Unemployment Forecasts 
The key unemployment forecasts are summarised in Table 
3 . 
 
The ILO rate is our preferred measure since it identifies 
those workers who are out of a job and are looking for work, 
whereas the claimant count simply records the unemployed 
who are in receipt of unemployment benefit. It appears from 
the latest data that employment growth has been weaker in 
Scotland than other regions, reducing the pull of labour into 
employment. Our forecast for unemployment on the ILO 
measure at the end of 2012 is now 265,250, up 34 thousand 
from the level seen at the end of 2011. As with our last 
forecast, we are expecting the unemployment position to 
improve through 2013, and are now forecasting 
unemployment at the end of that year of 253,950.  We are 
forecasting that the rate of unemployment at the end of 
2012 will be 9.8%, up significantly from our earlier forecasts. 
However, as previous quarters have demonstrated there is 
considerable uncertainty around the unemployment forecast 
due to the extent to which output change map into job 
change, changes in working population and independent 
variations in activity rates. In addition, we note the 
uncertainty around some of the employment estimates. We 
are concerned that some of the reported employee jobs 
series e.g. the series for Health, social work and care 
sector,  may overestimating the growth through 2011. If 
these are subject to later downward revision then 
employment levels could be much worse than our current 
statistics suggest. 
 
 
 
 
Brian Ashcroft 
24 February 2012 
 
 
____________________ 
 
Endnotes 
1See IMF, 2009, "What’s the Damage? Medium-term Output 
Dynamics After Banking Crises"  World Economic Outlook, October. 
 
2 
"Rebalancing and the Real Exchange Rate" – speech by Ben 
Broadbent , 26 September 2011 
 
3This doesn't sit too well with the Regional Activity 
 
4mainly macro at http://mainlymacro.blogspot.com/2012/02/budget-
deficits-changes-levels-and.html 
 
5Wren Lewis op cit 
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Summary 
The Scottish economy is likely to have seen negative growth 
in the final quarter of 2011. Further, the Scottish labour 
market has displayed weakness over the last few months as 
unemployment has increased and employment fallen. The 
outlook for domestic spending looks bleak in the short term 
due to slow wage growth and is further weakened over the 
medium term by reductions to household benefits, despite 
reductions in inflation easing some of the squeeze on real 
incomes. Prime export markets for Scottish goods and 
services appear to have returned to recession, with Euro 
Area forecasts cut radically since our last forecast. Without 
a switch of exports to fast-growing markets, or a 
(increasingly unlikely) quick return of stability to the Euro 
Area, the prospect for an export-led recovery appear limited 
in the near term. Job numbers are forecast to decline 
through 2012, recovering slowly through 2013 and 2014, 
with unemployment forecast to be 9.8% at the end of 2012 
and decline from there to the end of the forecast window. 
 
Monetary policy 
Currently, inflation appears to be heading in a rapidly 
downwards direction, with the CPI measure having fallen in 
each of the last four months. Prices are still increasing on 
the year, but at a lower rate – largely in line with 
expectations, as temporary shocks (including the VAT 
increase back to 17.5%, one-off increases in energy costs 
and higher import prices) work their way through the 
inflation measure. At the time of writing inflation had seen a 
large one month move from 4.2% in December to 3.6% in 
January 2012. The RPI rate had fallen by further in this 
same month, down from 4.8% to 3.9%. 
 
In the face of falling inflation, the Bank of England’s latest 
Inflation Report (February 2012) notes that interest rates are 
not expected to rise by 25 basis points until the third quarter 
of 2014: a point almost two quarters beyond what was 
expected in the last Inflation Report. This reflects an 
increasing concern within the Monetary Policy Committee 
about the downside risks to inflation over the medium term 
as growth appears weaker. The Bank’s central projections 
for inflation are (after continued falls through the first half of 
2012) generally below its target of 2% into 2014. At its 
February meeting, the Committee discussed raising its 
programme of asset purchases (“Quantitative Easing”) by 
£50 billion or £75 billion. From the minutes of that meeting 
we see that seven of the MPC voted in favour of a £50billion 
increase, up to £325 billion, with the other two members 
favouring a larger increase. There is increased speculation 
that this increase in asset purchases may not be the final 
movement of quantitative easing that the Bank undertakes. 
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Fiscal policy 
The headline from the Scottish Budget introduced earlier 
this year, and relating to 2012-13 was that most budgets 
continue to decline in real terms out to 2014-5, with the 
exception of the NHS budget. Some resource DEL spending 
has been transferred to annual capital DEL spending, with 
an additional £382 million between 2012 and 2015 above 
that level of capital spending previously announced. Roads 
projects appear to see the largest share of this additional 
capital spending, but there are also increases in the planned 
expenditure on stated areas such as rural broadband, NHS 
capital maintenance and affordable houses. More details of 
the announced Scottish Budget plans for this coming 
financial year were addressed in the November’s 
Commentary. 
 
The UK government fiscal consolidation continues, with the 
IFS estimating that 88% of the department DEL spending 
reductions have yet to take place. The prospects for 
government spending, either from Edinburgh or London, to 
provide a boost to economic activity continues to be limited. 
Some recent figures for the UK, but not for Scotland, 
continue to show government spending contributing to GDP 
growth. This appears to either be severance payments 
being counted as government spending – and so distorting 
the “true” path of government spending, or a technical 
classification issue requiring resolution.  
 
Output 
The latest GVA figures for Scotland were published on the 
18th of January and relate to Q3 2011. The headline figures 
show that through 2011 the Scottish economy has 
increasingly tracked developments in the UK economy as a 
whole. Q3 saw an increase of growth of 0.5%, identical to 
that seen in the UK as a whole. Over the year (i.e. a rolling 
four quarters), growth in Scotland was 0.9%, while the UK 
saw growth of 1.3%. Scottish GVA remains 3.3% below its 
peak from the second quarter of 2008, while – at the end of 
Q3 2011 – the UK was 3.6% below its pre-recession peak 
from the first quarter of 2008. It is therefore 13 quarters 
since the peak of output in Scotland.   
 
Looking at the sectoral performance there were however, 
quite sizeable differences between Scotland and the UK. 
Over the last year, the Scottish production, construction and 
agriculture sectors all outperformed the sectors at the UK 
level. While on the surface this suggests a stronger 
performance in Scotland, the shifts in the third quarter for 
these broad sectoral groupings were all weaker in Scotland 
than the UK. Over the year, the service sector in Scotland 
grew 0.3%, while at the UK level this sector grew 1.2%. 
Over the last quarter the Scottish service sector 
outperformed the UK comparison. This was significantly 
affected by the growth of the business services and finance 
sector, which saw growth of over 2%. The construction 
sector, which had previously shown strong growth on a 
quarterly basis, shrank by 1.2% in Scotland compared to 
0.3% growth in the UK. This confirmed four consecutive 
quarters of negative growth for the construction sector in 
Scotland. 
 
The largest contribution to Scottish growth in the third 
quarter was the business services and finance sector. 
Construction and production sectors (constituting around 
8% and 17% of Scottish GDP respectively) both made 
negative contributions in this quarter. 
 
The last quarter saw two changes in the methodology used 
to estimate the Scottish GDP series. The first of these 
introduced a new price deflator series, replacing Retail Price 
Index with a Consumer Price Index measure, making 
Scottish series more comparable to international methods. 
The second change was a substantial revision to the series 
on banks and building societies within the financial services 
sector (comprising around 7% of Scottish GDP). This 
change has been made retrospectively, with the 
consequence that developments in this important sub-sector 
of the Scottish economy now appears to have seen quite a 
different pattern of growth than previous estimated. The 
decline in this sector since the start of 2008 has been 
significantly lessened. Despite sizeable impacts on the 
financial services sector, the consequences of this change 
for aggregate Scottish GVA appear to be minimal.  
 
Survey evidence on production during the final quarter of 
2011 indicated that this saw a troubled trading period across 
many sectors, both in Scotland and the UK. Growth in 
output through January 2012 appears to have moved 
positively from the levels seen in December, according to 
the Regional PMI survey. January’s PMI survey suggests 
that while growth across the UK has rebounded strongly at 
the start of 2012, Scotland has seen a far smaller increase 
in output than the UK as a whole. Only Wales, Northern 
Ireland and the South West of England have a lower index 
for January’s figures.   
 
At the UK level, January’s preliminary estimate of Q4 2011 
GDP was for a decline of -0.2% on the previous quarter.    
This appears to have been broadly in line with expectations, 
with a quarter of negative growth expected given weak 
demand signals in the final quarter. Production sectors at 
the UK level saw a decline of 1.2% overall, while there was 
also a contraction in the construction sector (-0.5%) . The 
aggregate measure of “services” grew by 0% in Q4. The 
strongest growth at the sectoral level within services was 
from the government and other public services sector, which 
grew by 0.4%, and by an estimated 2.5% during 2011. One 
possible suggestion as to how this can occur during a period 
of fiscal austerity is that these figures reflect redundancy 
payments or, indeed, are overstating the contribution of 
government spending to growth and will be revised down in 
future quarters – with the impact of revising down overall 
growth (Kirby, 2011).  
 
Looking forward, January’s minutes of the MPC suggest a 
forecast held by the group for flat growth in Q4 2011 and Q1 
2012. This would therefore suggest that small positive 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
Figure A:  Real household consumption, Scotland and UK 1998Q1 to 2011Q3, 2008=100 
 
 
 
 
Figure B:  Household savings ratio, Scotland and UK, 1998Q1 to 2011Q3 
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Figure C:  Real gross fixed capital formation expenditure, Scotland and UK, 1998Q1 to 2011Q3, 2008=100 
 
 
 
 
growth is anticipated in Q1 2012. Developments through 
2012 continue to be shadowed by the prospect of 
“dislocation” within the core and periphery economies of the 
Eurozone. Growth forecasts for the UK are discussed 
alongside the central forecast for Scottish growth. 
  
Household  
As noted in the Overview of the Labour Market section of 
this Commentary, wage growth has fallen since 2007, and in 
the year to June 2011 real wage growth fell by over 3% for 
the second year in a row. This is being caused by weak 
income growth coupled with higher levels of inflation. Low 
income growth remains an issue across the Scottish and UK 
economies. It is likely that stronger wage growth would have 
come at the expense of much reduced employment levels. 
In our forecasts, weak household income growth is 
anticipated to continue to act as a drag on spending through 
2012. Reductions in the rate of inflation ease some of the 
pressure on household budgets, but real terms growth in 
income is not expected through the first two years of our 
forecast (2012 and 2013). As well as weaker income growth 
and increasing prices, government policy on reductions in 
benefit levels and spending will continue to impact on those 
more reliant on these forms of income, with potential 
significant consequences for household income inequality. 
 
Movements in wealth indexes over the recent past suggest 
that some household wealth measures have fallen during 
2011. According to the Halifax House Price index, the 
average value of a home in Scotland fell in 2011 by 3.5%, 
slightly more than the fall in house prices across the UK in 
that year (-2.6%). Interestingly, the fall in house prices 
across the UK in 2011, by this survey, contrasts with the 
growth seen in 2010. Looking at the quarterly series, 
average house prices in Scotland were down 22.7% on their 
2008Q1 peak at the end of 2011. At the UK as a whole, the 
peak in prices came in the third quarter of 2007, and prices 
are currently 18.9% lower than their peak. 
 
As a barometer of household spending, the latest figures 
from the Scottish Retail Consortium for sales in January 
2012 were not promising. Like-for-like sales were down 
2.6% on a year previously, with the largest fall in total sales 
for any month since 1999. These figures are perhaps 
affected by the VAT changes at the start of 2011, making 
the comparison figure unrepresentative of January last year. 
SRC’s figures also indicate lower consumer confidence in 
Scotland than the UK as a whole. 
 
Of course, retail sales are only part of household spending. 
The most complete picture of Scottish household 
consumption is produced in the Scottish National Accounts 
Project data, which are comparable to UK series on 
consumption spending. We have previously noted that 
consumption spending in Scotland appeared to have been 
growing at a slower rate than the UK as a whole (while UK 
consumption growth was also weak). As of the third quarter 
of 2011, both Scottish and UK consumption indices were 
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down from levels seen during 2010. The Bank of England 
notes that real UK household consumption is only 1% above 
the trough seen in 2009Q2, while by our calculations 
Scottish spending is 0.9% above its trough in the same 
quarter. Scottish consumption spending is therefore 
appearing to grow (marginally) more slowly in Scotland. This 
is shown in Figure A. 
 
Recent movements in the households savings ratio continue 
to show increased savings compared to pre-recession 
period. The UK level of household saving as a portion of 
gross income in the third quarter of 2011 stands at 6.6%, 
slightly below the rate for Scottish households (6.8%). In the 
growth years of 2002-2007, the average quarterly Scottish 
saving ratio was 4.6%, while for the UK this was 3.8%. 
Taking this back further, there was little difference between 
the average savings ratio between the UK and Scottish 
savings ratio between 1998 and 2007 at 4.7% in Scotland 
and 4.6% in the UK. Since the start of 2008, the average 
savings ratio has increased by more in Scotland, with an 
average of 7.5%, to the UK’s 6.0%.  
 
The Bank of England’s February 2012 Inflation Report 
suggests three reasons for an increased household savings 
rate post-recession: 
 
x Expectations of lower future earnings (including 
lower pensions);  
x Job insecurity and fears of loss of income; 
x Tighter credit conditions for households. 
 
The question remains however, why are Scottish 
households exhibiting a higher rate of savings than UK 
households as a whole? Looking at the points above, we 
would not expect that household credit conditions (i.e. the 
availability of credit) are different in Scotland compared to 
the UK. What might differ on this point could be the 
willingness of households take on credit, although we are 
not aware of any evidence to support this. Fears of job 
security may be stronger in those employed in the public 
sectors, with fiscal consolidation continuing over the next 
few years. Scotland has a larger share of employment in the 
public sector than the UK; therefore households as a whole 
may increase their savings. The Scottish Government has, 
however, stated that there will be no compulsory 
redundancies in the activities under their control. Many 
workers, particularly those in public sectors, will be 
anticipating below inflation wage increases over the coming 
years, and may be increasing savings accordingly.  
 
Investment 
The third quarter of 2011 saw an upturn in the growth of 
stocks in the UK as a whole, perhaps due to weaker than 
expected demand in this quarter. Business investment 
spending in the UK is around 15% down from its pre-
recession peak, while the latest Bank of England Inflation 
report shows that the lack of demand continues to be the 
principal reason given for firms’ holding back making 
investments. Since the credit crunch the importance of 
availability of finance for not making investments has 
increased, although its importance compared to the demand 
outlook has not changed. 
 
The method used to construct figures on investment 
spending in Scotland has been revised in the most recent 
quarter. These latest data come from the Scottish National 
Accounts Project. Figure C shows the levels of investment 
spending over the period covered by the survey – from the 
start of 1998. Focusing on the period since the start of the 
recession, we see that real investment spending appears to 
have fallen less significantly in Scotland than in the UK as a 
whole. Where the most recent data suggests a sharp uptick 
in investment spending in Q3, this is not evident in the 
Scottish figures, where the rate of growth appears to have 
slowed (slightly) during 2011. Given these are recently 
released data series, we hope to return to this series in later 
Commentaries. 
 
Tourism 
Looking forward, survey evidence suggests a weakening of 
demand from overseas visitors in Q1 2012. Over the rest of 
2012, the London Olympics and Paralympics is arguably the 
most high profile single tourism driver in the UK. It is hoped 
that this will encourage tourism visits into the UK, and 
Scotland through overseas visitors taking additional within-
UK trips around the Games themselves. In aggregate terms 
however, the tourism expenditure related to people 
attending the games is likely to be small. Much of the impact 
of the Olympics on tourism spending found by Blake (2005) 
for example, comes from increases in the level of tourism to 
the UK before and after the games a result of raising the 
profile of the UK tourism offering. It might be argued that this 
impact would be larger for locations with lower tourism 
profiles, seeking to position themselves internationally 
alongside a global elite of destinations (which London is 
arguably already part of). 
 
In addition, Blake (2005) reports a negative effect on the 
spending of residents of where the games are held during 
the games themselves as residents go out for 
dinner/entertainment activities less during the period of the 
games. If Games-related expenditures by households come 
from reduced savings then there could be a net-benefit from 
additional spending. Of course, similar issues will be likely to 
arise around the Glasgow Commonwealth Games in 2014, 
and we will return to this in more detail in a later forecast. A 
recent paper in the Economic Journal (Rose and Spiegel, 
2011) found that there was indeed an “Olympic effect” from 
hosting “mega-events” (such as major international sporting 
events), but that this was due to a trade (export) increase, 
which, the authors argued, was “attributable to the signal a 
country sends when bidding to host the games, rather than 
the act of actually holding a mega-event [like the Olympics]”.  
 
Trade 
At the UK level, trade contributed positively to the growth 
seen in 2011. Indeed, the domestic economy – consumption 
(public and private) and investment – are estimated to have 
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declined in this year. While exports grew by 4.75% in the 
year to 2011, this was down on growth seen in 2010. 
Slowed import growth contributed to the net boost from 
trade at the UK level.  
 
The most frequently updated measure of Scottish exports to 
the rest of the world (ROW) is the Index of Manufactured 
Exports (IME). This survey reports changes in the real (i.e. 
inflation adjusted) volume of exports by manufacturing 
companies based in Scotland to the rest of the world. The 
latest figures relate to Q3 2011 (and were published on the 
same day as Q3 GDP figures). The latest data showed a 
slowing of the growth in ROW exports to 0.2% from the 
previous quarter. On a rolling four-quarter growth, exports 
increased by 2.7% (up from 2.1%). At the sub-
manufacturing level, the largest contribution to ROW export 
growth in the last quarter, and also over the last year, came 
from the food, drink and tobacco sector, which increased 
2.6% in the last quarter and 4.6% over the year.  
 
The Global Connections Survey (GCS) is a less frequent 
(i.e. annual rather than quarterly) but more comprehensive 
survey (i.e. all sectors) of Scottish export activity. The latest 
report, published in January 2012, painted a mixed picture 
of export performance over 2010, compared to 2009. These 
data, relate to the economic picture of over a year ago. 
While this means that these data are not directly useful for 
informing the trading picture at this moment, they do provide 
a useful snapshot of the performance of important sectors 
for the Scottish economy. With exports anticipated to 
contribute positively to economic performance over the 
coming years, with reduced reliance upon domestic (i.e. 
Scottish) demand, this type of information is critical.  
 
The GCS reports that Scottish international (ROW) exports 
rose by £355million between 2009 and 2010, and stood at 
£21,980million during 2010. By destination, the major 
markets remains the EU (supporting almost half of this 
external demand) and North America. The importance of 
Asian markets fell by £300million during the year. This is 
particularly disappointing, given quite significant increases 
over the recent past in developing markets in Asia. 
 
The same publication also reports the value of exports 
between Scotland and the rest of the UK (RUK), although 
these are published by the Scottish Government with 
significant “health warnings” about the robustness of this 
data sample. This would appear to be another area of 
Scottish economic data where evidence-supported 
knowledge lags economic, and also political, interest by a 
considerable margin. Many reasons exist why the data on 
intra-regional UK trade is difficult to capture – no statutory 
obligation on firms; definitional issues of what is an “export”; 
the specific residence of the final consumer, etc. – so this 
would be no easy task. It is promising therefore that the 
GCS notes that Scottish Government work is ongoing 
regarding the identification and quantification of RUK 
exports.  
The GCS reports that RUK exports from Scotland rose by 
almost £2000 million in the year to 2010, up to 
£44,950million during 2010. The rest of the UK therefore is 
responsible for over two-third of exports from Scotland. This 
is what we would expect for a small very open economy 
located next to a much larger economy, i.e. the RUK. 
Further, we can also suggest that Scotland’s direct exports 
understate the true importance of trade with the rest of the 
world for economic activity in Scotland. Items sold as 
intermediate items in the production process, or down the 
supply-chain of final products, would not count as exports 
from Scotland, but to the extent that they are sold outside 
the UK (and so count as UK exports) there was Scottish 
activity at an earlier stage.  
 
We discuss recent and historic trends in exports from 
Scotland to the rest of the UK and rest of the world in Box 1. 
 
Looking forward, the major obvious challenge to Scottish 
exports during 2012 and future years is the continuing 
unfolding of stability in the Euro Area. This economic area is 
the prime destination for Scottish ROW exports: seven of 
the top ten export markets for Scottish goods are Euro 
members (the others being the USA, Norway and 
Switzerland). A recent report on the Euro Area (Euroframe, 
2011) had a central forecast for growth in the Euro Area of 
0% in 2012 and 1.4% in 2013, however on the “downside” 
scenario of -2.1% in 2012 and -1.2% in 2013. This is a 
remarkable range (2.6 percentage points in absolute terms) 
between alternative scenarios at such a forecast horizon, 
but reflects the potential for a decisive downturn in the 
economic prospects under plausible scenarios. Indeed, 
while presented as alternative scenarios, the report sets 
these on the work of Blanchard (2011) as some of the 
possible “multiple equilibria – self-fulfilling outcomes of 
pessimism or optimism”. Continued sovereign debt fears 
increasingly threatening the core countries, accelerating 
fiscal consolidation in the core and periphery, and worries 
about the stability of the Euro banking system are not a 
recipe for stability or growth, and it would be unwise to 
attempt to predict with certainty the likely future of the Euro 
project over the coming years. On the other hand, our 
forecasts require us to make a case for growth in the 
coming years, and – relative to November’s commentary – 
we have revised down the growth in demand for Scottish 
goods from the rest of the world due to the continued 
worries about growth in the Euro area.  
 
Table 1 shows the GDP growth forecasts for the main six 
export markets for Scottish (non-UK) exports. Growth 
prospects during 2012 appear poor, with only the US 
economy forecast to grow by more than 1.5%. The IMF 
forecasts a 0.5% contraction in growth in 2012 in the Euro 
Area, a revision down of 1.6 percentage points on their 
forecast from September 2011. This indicates one clear link 
between the rapidly changing political environment and 
economic outlook. Prospects in core Scottish export 
markets are forecasted to improve slightly through 2013, 
with the Euro Area forecast to grow by 0.8% (IMF) or 1.4%
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Box 1:  Export performance over the recent past 
The figures for exports produced in the Global Connection Survey are in current prices, i.e. the values are in “nominal” 
terms, where the value of one pound between years will change with inflation. Small increases in nominal values for 
exports could be offset by increases in price levels, masking the “real” movement in the value of exports. An important 
adjustment is to convert this nominal series into a constant price series. This is not a straightforward task. As with 
previous Fraser Economic Commentaries, we have used Scottish-specific current and real price figures for 
manufacturing exports, alongside UK services export deflators, to estimate real growth in sectoral exports over time. 
These data should be considered illustrative given the data quality, particularly the lack of product specific Scottish trade 
deflator series for service sector exports. Where UK proxies are not appropriate, this would mean that the real rates of 
growth could be different from that reported here. Caveats notwithstanding, we present our results below, and begin to 
draw some tentative findings: 
 
1.1 Rest of the UK exports 
Compound 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate (whole 
period)
Compound 
Annual 
Growth Rate 
(2002-2007)
Compound 
Annual 
Growth Rate 
(2008-2010)
All RUK exports 4.2% 9.9% 0.6%
All RUK manufacturing exports 0.4% 1.9% 0.6%
All RUK manufacturing exports minus electrical and instrument engineering 1.9% 4.0% 1.4%
All RUK non-manufacturing exports 5.1% 13.0% -1.1%
All RUK service exports (above minus utilities, construction, agriculture and quarrying) 5.5% 13.4% -0.9%
 
 
The annual growth rate of exports to the rest of the UK was 4.2% over the period from 2002 to 2010. The impact of the 
recession is clear: looking at the pre-recession (up to the end of 2007), and the recession period (from 2008 onwards), 
we see that export growth fell from an annual rate of 9.9% to 0.6%.  
 
Breaking this down by sectoral/product exports, we see that non-manufacturing exports have provided the strong support 
for export growth to the rest of the UK, rather than manufacturing exports. The annual growth rate over the whole period 
for all service sectors was 5.5%, with a very strong growth pre-recession and actually a real terms annual average 
decline over the years since the recession (-0.9%). Manufacturing exports on the other hand shows a far smaller, but 
positive, growth rate in both periods. Removing the electrical and instrument engineering exports, which fell sharply at the 
start of the sample, annual average growth was just 1.9% over the whole sample. These results suggest the growing 
importance of service sector exports for total exports to the rest of the UK. 
 
1.2  Rest of the world exports 
Compound 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate (whole 
period)
Compound 
Annual 
Growth Rate 
(2002-2007)
Compound 
Annual 
Growth Rate 
(2008-2010)
All ROW exports -0.4% -0.5% -0.6%
All ROW manufacturing exports (IME) -1.3% -0.2% -2.0%
All ROW manufacturing exports (GCS) -3.8% -4.2% -2.3%
All ROW manufacturing exports (GCS) minus electrical and instrument engineering 1.3% 4.4% -1.4%
All ROW non-manufacturing exports 6.4% 8.3% 1.3%
All ROW service exports (non-manufacturing minus utilities, construction, agriculture and 6.8% 8.9% 1.4%
 
 
The most striking result from the same analysis of ROW exports is that all these exports appear to have reduced on an 
annual basis by -0.4% over the period of the sample. The same growth rate is seen in both the pre- and recession 
periods. Again, we see the strong performance of the non-manufacturing and service sectors in improving Scotland’s 
export performance, while manufacturing export growth has been considerably weaker.  
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Box 1 (cont’d)  
 
1.3  Relative increase in importance of rest of the UK 
Another interesting feature of the GCS data was the apparent emergence of the rest of the UK as the major destination of 
Scottish exports, rather than the non-UK rest of the world. These data suggest that Scotland’s major export market over the 
last decade has always been the rest of the UK, but that the importance of the rest of the UK has grown. Using the full data 
series (2002 to 2010) of the Global Connection Survey (GCS) alongside the same measure from the Scottish Government 
produced Input-Output tables series (covering 1998 to 2007), as produced by the Scottish Government, we can examine 
this shift through time. The results are given in Figure B1 below. 
 
Figure B1: Share (%) of total Scottish exports going to non-UK rest of the world, 1998 to 2010 
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This diagram appears to show that the rest of the UK has become a more important destination for Scottish goods over the 
last decade. Non-UK exports from Scotland have fallen from around 40% of all exports to just above 30%. The timing of the 
movement appears to be slightly different between the two series, but it seems to have happened over a small number of 
years. For example, the shakeout occurred in 2002-2004 on the GCS measure, while the IO tables suggest 2001-2003 saw 
the biggest change.  
 
Looking at the IO tables, it appears that the falling exports to the rest of the world by the Scottish electronics sector 
correspond entirely with this decline. These lost exports by this sector removed a significant portion of Scottish exports to 
the rest of the world. From 2001 to 2003, the nominal value of ROW exports from the “Office machinery and computers” 
sector declined from £3,950 million to £597 million. Figure B2 shows the share of total exports from Scotland which were 
produced by this sector between 1998 and 2007. This sector produced almost 10% of all Scottish exports in 2000, but by 
2003, this had fallen to below 2%. Taking all electronics sectors exports (defined as sectors 69-75 in the IO tables) these 
reveal a similar pattern, declining from 15% in 2000 to 4% by 2003. As of 2007 the broad electronics sector produced only 
2% of Scottish exports.  
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Box 1 (cont’d)  
 
Figure B2:  Exports to the rest of the world by the “office machinery and computer” sector as a share 
of total exports from Scotland, 1998 to 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: GDP growth forecasts for 2012 and 2013 for export markets for Scottish products, plus UK, Euro 
area and China growth rate, including changes from earlier forecasts where available 
 
 2012 2013 
   
 IMF Change from 
Sep 2011 
forecasts 
OECD IMF Change from 
Sep 2011 
forecasts 
OECD 
USA 1.8% 0.0% 2.0% 2.2% -0.3% 2.5% 
Netherlands n/a n/a 0.3% n/a n/a 1.5% 
France 0.2% -1.2% 0.3% 1.0% -0.9% 1.4% 
Belgium n/a n/a 0.5% n/a n/a 1.6% 
Germany 0.3% -1.0% 0.6% 1.5% 0.0% 1.9% 
Ireland n/a n/a 1.0% n/a n/a 2.4% 
       
UK 0.6% -1.0% 0.5% 2.0% -0.4% 1.8% 
China 8.2% -0.8% 8.5% 8.8% -0.7% 9.5% 
Euro area -0.5% -1.6% 0.2% 0.8% -0.7% 1.4% 
 
 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook (Update), 24th January 2012; OECD Economic Outlook, November 2011 
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(OECD). The UK picture is forecasted to improve slightly as 
well, with growth of around 2% predicted by both 
organisations. 
 
Forward looking survey evidence on Scottish exports 
suggest a general agreement that export activity has slowed 
towards the end of 2011, particularly affecting output in 
manufacturing sectors. Scottish Engineering reported a 
downward trend in orders, while the SCBS survey – which 
had seen increases in export orders over the previous four 
quarters – saw export orders fall, with a continued decline in 
orders expected in Q1 2012. Across the board, business 
confidence in the key production sectors has weakened 
significantly since Autumn 2011, with continued fears about 
exports a primary factor. 
 
Forecasts for the Scottish economy 
The large unknowable in this forecast scenarios, as with 
forecasts over much of the recent past, remains the fragile 
political and economic state of the Euro area. At the same 
time, we are faced with continued weaknesses in the 
domestic (Scottish) economy. The last three months of 2011 
are likely to have seen a fall in output, in line with earlier 
expectations given weak production figures. Sluggish signs 
of positive growth from surveys, along with weakening 
business confidence for orders in the first half of 2012 do 
not give a hugely positive outlook for the overall Scottish 
economy over the short- and medium-term.  
The outlook for domestic demand remains weak with wages 
increasing at below previous rates and a continued high rate 
of household savings. With weak consumption spending, 
our forecast for household expenditure remains broadly flat 
(0.2%) through 2012, with small growth in 2013 and 2014.  
 
Government (non-capital) spending is forecast to reduce in 
real terms over the next three years at an increasing rate as 
departmental cuts outlined in the CSR from Autumn 2010 
are implemented. The IFS in January 2012 outlined that 
some 88% of planned DEL reductions have yet to be 
implemented. This will continue to exert a downward 
pressure on domestic demand. The data appears to suggest 
that government spending has fallen faster in real terms in 
Scotland than the UK as a whole, although there are some 
question marks around the measured expenditure 
contribution of government spending at the UK level. Where 
this relates to redundancy payments, for instance, it is 
unclear if these charges would show up in the data at the 
regional level, or if they would be processed within the 
Westminster “centre” (and so reveal themselves solely in 
the UK data, even for Scottish-located “reserved” 
employment). We would expect that any such payments 
would be included within the Scottish spending component. 
We anticipate an increasing rate of government spending 
reductions in Scotland through to the end of our forecast 
horizon in 2014. 
 
As mentioned earlier, prospects for Scottish exports remain 
hugely uncertain. Growth prospects in the rest of the UK – 
Scotland’s largest export market – remain low. The OBR 
forecasts 0.7% growth in 2012, but this is above the 
average of new independent forecast of 0.4%. The OBR 
forecasts date from November and so are before any of the 
most recent developments in the Euro Area. Scottish export 
prospects to the rest of the UK are strongly correlated with 
UK economic growth, so weak growth is likely to be bad for 
Scottish exports. The continued reliance of Scottish non-UK 
exports on the economies of the Euro Area and EU, and 
falling sales to Asian markets in 2010, show the difficulties 
in expanding this critical part of Scottish output. We forecast 
that exports to the rest of the UK and rest of the World from 
Scotland grow in each year from 2012 to 2014 at an 
increasing rate, but that they only return to broadly trend 
growth by the end of the forecast horizon. 
 
Prospects for investment growth in Scotland through the first 
half of 2012 appear weak as inventory growth at the UK 
level – for which more timely data is available – suggests a 
lower rate of stockbuilding in important sectors. Public 
infrastructure spending is likely to be critical for short-term 
developments, but is around one-third of all investment 
spending in a typical year, so the importance of private 
investment is clear. The OBR forecast a divergence in these 
(public and private) investment series as public austerity is 
partially offset by rebounding private sector investment. 
 
Results 
We have extended our forecast horizon out to 2014. This 
means that we have a forecast horizon of over three years, 
as the final data for 2014 will not be known until April/May of 
2015. As previously, we are forecasting year-on-year real 
growth in Scottish Gross Value Added (GVA). 
 
The aggregate forecasts for growth in Gross Value Added in 
Scotland for 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 are shown in 
Figure 1. This figure also shows (for comparison only) the 
forecasts for the UK over the same period from a number of 
sources. Firstly, we show the forecasts by the Office for 
Budgetary Responsibility (OBR) produced in November 
2011. Secondly, we show the median of new forecasts for 
the UK in 2011 and 2012 made by independent forecasts in 
the last three months. These are collated and produced 
monthly by the UK Treasury. Thirdly, we show the longer-
term forecasts for the UK produced every three months by 
the Treasury, including forecasts for 2013 and 2014. Note 
that the OBR forecast of 0.7% for 2011 (made in November 
2011) was itself revised down from 1.7% in the March of 
that year. 
 
We have raised our central forecast for growth in 2011 up 
slightly from 0.4% to 0.7%. The increase in output measured 
for the third quarter of 2011 was stronger than expected (a 
0.5% increase), and broadly tracked the UK growth in that 
quarter. This upward revision has brought our forecast in 
line with our earlier forecast from June 2011, where we 
forecast 0.8% growth during 2011. In March 2011 we had 
forecast annual growth of 1.0% in 2011. Our new forecast 
for 2012 of 0.4% would not be inconsistent with one or 
possibly two quarters of negative growth through 2012. 
FEBRUARY 2012 PAGE 31 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
Figure 1:  GVA growth for Scotland, 2011 to 2014 and comparison UK forecasts, annual real % 
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Indeed the Bank of England’s Governor, Mervyn King, noted 
the possibility of a “zigzagging” phase for growth over the 
coming year. 
 
In November 2011, we forecast growth in 2013 of 1.6%, so 
our latest forecast is revised up slightly. This is the first 
instance that we have forecast growth in 2014. The 
forecasted growth path from the third quarter of 2011 
through to the end of our forecast horizon, and the 
implications for the level of Scottish GVA, is discussed in 
Box 2. 
 
 
As well as forecasting the aggregate shifts in the Scottish 
economy, we present our forecast by broad industrial 
grouping. Table 2 gives real growth in sectoral GVA for the 
Production, Services and Construction sectors.  
 
Table 2:  Growth in the Scottish economy, 2011 to 2014, % change from previous year 
 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
Gross Value Added 0.7% 0.4% 1.7% 2.6% 
Production 2.0% 1.0% 4.0% 6.0% 
Services 0.4% 0.3% 1.1% 1.9% 
Construction 0.4% 0.3% 1.1% 1.7% 
 
 
As previously explained, the weak outlook for domestic 
demand through the next few years means that sectors 
which are principally domestic-facing, i.e. serving Scottish-
only customers, are expected to continue to bear the 
consequences of  slower household expenditure growth and 
declining real government spending. The services sector is 
forecast to see a relative slowdown in growth in 2012 
compared to 2011, of 0.3% and recover to almost 2% 
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Box 2: A return to pre-recession real GVA could take over two and a half years 
 
Taking our new forecasts we can predict at what point the pre-recession peak of real GVA will be reached. As others have 
commentated, whether or not growth is above or below peak, or indeed the UK rate, is slightly academic so long as the 
economy remains around depressed levels. Figure B1 gives the path of GVA for Scotland which is consistent with our 
(central) forecasts for growth. We have taken the starting point of this chart as the end of Q3 2011 and estimated a final 
quarter growth rate consistent with our new 2011 forecast. While we only forecast annual growth, and not quarter by quarter, 
we have assumed that each quarter grows at a rate consistent with its share of the annual growth rate.  
 
By these calculations, in the third quarter of 2014 Scottish GVA will return to its pre-recession peak, just in time for the 
Commonwealth Games in Glasgow (23rd July to 3rd August 2014). Recall however that this is simply making up the output 
lost during the recession, i.e. bring it back to the Q2 2008 level. The gap between the path of GVA without the recession and 
the actual path will demonstrate the size of the output lost during what has been termed the “Great Recession”. 
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growth in 2014. A similar path is forecast for the 
construction sector, although this sector is likely to respond 
quickly to any upswing in business investment. The 
production sector is forecast to see the strongest growth 
over the coming years. We are forecasting that growth in the 
production sectors in 2012 will be only half (i.e. 1%, rather 
than 2%) its growth during 2011 as export markets for 
Scottish products see possible falls in output. In the later 
two years of our forecast window we expect to see a return 
to stronger export growth. 
 
As reported in the last Commentary (Allan, 2011) we can 
use our estimated forecast errors to show ranges around 
our central point estimates. We roll this forward in this 
commentary and use forecast errors from the “Spring” 
forecasts we evaluated. There were three forecasts made in 
the Spring of the year that were identified in this work: the 
spring after the year has finished but before the GVA figures 
are released (we called this the “following Spring”, as its 
forecast related to the year completed); the forecast made in 
the Spring of the year that the forecast relates to, and; the 
forecast made in the spring of the year before the year it 
relates to. In this instance therefore, these three forecast 
horizons refer to the growth forecasts for 2011, 2012 and 
2013 respectively. The measured Mean Absolute Errors for 
the spring forecasts and the first release estimates of GVA 
were 0.153 percentage points, 0.548 percentage points and 
1.216 percentage points, respectively – with the forecast 
error increasing as the forecast horizon lengthens. 
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Figure 2: GVA growth in Scotland in central case and possible errors around forecasts for different 
forecast horizons 
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These MAE estimates are used to give ranges around the 
point estimates we predict for growth in each year to 2014. 
For 2014 we assume that the forecast error will be no larger 
than that for the spring of the year before (i.e. 2013’s 
forecast), while in practice this is likely to underestimate the 
forecast error at this distance. The estimated ranges around 
our central case are given in Figure 2. Figure 3, Figure 4 
and Figure 5 give the GVA changes for the Production, 
Services and Construction sectors respectively in the 
central, upper and lower cases.  
 
Employment 
The most recent data for the labour market in Scotland 
indicates that in the final quarter of 2011 (i.e. October to 
December 2011), employment fell by four thousand, while 
(ILO) unemployment increased by sixteen thousand, to 
stand at 2,458,000 and 231,000 respectively. The 
employment rate of those of working age fell by 0.4 
percentage points to 70.7, while the ILO unemployment rate 
for the same group rose by 0.6 percentage points to 8.8%. 
The increase in the rate of unemployment is the largest 
such increase since the first quarter of 2010, and brings the 
unemployment rate above its earlier peak since the 2008-9 
recession began. The unemployment rate is now equal to 
what is was in the final quarter of 1996. The rate of those of 
working age economically inactive remained constant at 
22.5%. Detailed commentary on developments in the labour 
market are detailed in the Labour market section of the 
Fraser Economic Commentary. The unemployment rate of 
young people remains a prime concern for forecasts of 
employment and unemployment in Scotland, as does an 
increasing duration of those individuals receiving 
Jobseekers Allowance (no such duration statistics are 
available for ILO unemployed). There is evidence from 
previous recessions that the longer term unemployed have 
greater difficulty getting back into work, while increasing 
unemployment on young people is a growing social and 
political, as well as economic, issue across the developed 
world. 
 
The most recent data on employee jobs date from Q3 2011 
and indicate that there were 2,272 thousand employee jobs 
in Scotland. This was down 11 thousand on the previous 
quarter, and down 23 thousand on the end of 2010 total. 
The employee jobs series has been revised slightly since 
our last commentary, with the number of employee jobs in 
Scotland in the second quarter of 2011 being reduced from 
2,292,200 to 2,282,600 (down almost ten thousand).  
 
Given the now lower level of employee jobs in Scotland, we 
are revising down our forecasts for employee jobs at the 
end of 2011. In November we forecast that there would be 
2,299,000 jobs at the end of 2011 in Scotland. We now 
forecast that there will be 2,254,000 jobs in Scotland at the 
end of 2011 (a loss of 40,400 jobs during 2011). 
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Figure 3: GVA growth forecast in Production sector in central, lower and upper cases, 2011 to 2014 
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Figure 4: GVA growth forecast in Construction sector in central, lower and upper cases, 2011 to 2014 
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Figure 5: GVA growth forecast in Services sector in central, lower and upper cases, 2011 to 2014 
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Figure 6: Scottish ILO and claimant count unemployment rate, history and forecast 
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Our forecasts for employee jobs, including a breakdown 
between broad sectoral groups, are shown in Table 3. The 
number of employee jobs in Scotland is forecast to decline 
during 2012 by just less than 16,000 jobs. Within the 
sectors, however, we are forecasting a reduction in jobs in 
the service sectors of over sixteen thousand jobs. Public 
sector reductions in employee jobs are forecasted to be 
around 7 thousand over the year, while there are also 
forecast to be reductions in jobs in Retail and Wholesale. 
Within the service sectors however, we do not forecast 
declines in job numbers, with increases in employment in 
Business Services sector. Through 2013 and 2014 we 
forecast increases in employee jobs in our central forecast, 
with annual increases of over 23 thousand and 38 thousand 
respectively. At the broad sectoral level we forecast 
employment increases, however, as in 2012 we forecast a 
“rebalancing” of employment within the services sectors 
towards non-public activities as public spending reductions 
continue. Construction employment is forecast to increase in 
both 2013 and 2014 as spending on (private) investment 
projects returns as confidence in the recovery returns. The 
employee jobs forecast consistent with our upper and lower 
forecasts are presented in Table 4. 
 
Our employee jobs forecast are for lower jobs numbers than 
previous forecast, with our November 2011 forecast seeing 
(slightly) positive annual jobs growth in 2012. This more 
negative outlook for jobs is down to two major factors.  
Firstly, the jobs market appears to have significantly 
weakened through the latter half of 2011, with increasing 
unemployment and falling employment. Combined with 
much of the public sector employee jobs reductions still to 
materialise in the data, we cannot ignore the possibility of 
further falls in the jobs series. Secondly, data revisions show 
there to have been a more significant jobs reduction in the 
early half of 2011 than was previously observed. It takes the 
jobs numbers longer to recover to their earlier (high) levels 
as they are starting from a lower base than was previously 
assumed. 
 
We should caution that these jobs data themselves appear 
to be uncertain and therefore potentially subject to revision. 
The data on employee jobs for Scotland appear to suggest 
an increase of almost 45 thousand jobs in the “Health, social 
work and care” sector since the end of 2010. While these 
data are noted by ONS to be “unreliable”, they are included 
in the total for employee jobs in Scotland. Such an increase 
in activity in this sector does not appear in the public sector 
jobs series – and any switching of classification, e.g. from 
public to private, would not show up as an increase in 
overall jobs numbers in these data. This suggests that 
further revisions are likely. Such revisions could further 
revise down the level of employee jobs in Scotland. It is 
hoped that the uncertainty around this jobs series can be 
resolved quickly as it has repercussions for the aggregate 
level of jobs in the Scottish labour market. 
 
 
Table 3: Forecasts of Scottish employee jobs (000s) and net change in employee jobs in central scenario, 
2011 to 2014 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
Total employee jobs (000s), Dec 2,254 2,238        2,261             2,299 
Net annual change (jobs) -40,400 -16,000       23,200           38,000 
% change from previous year -1.8% -0.7% 1.0% 1.7% 
Agriculture (jobs, 000s) 32 32             33                 35 
Annual change -550 300 950            1,900 
Production (jobs, 000s) 220 222           233                248 
Annual change -3,950 2,150       11,250           15,400 
Services (jobs, 000s) 1,869 1,853        1,861             1,878 
Annual change -33,500 -16,150        8,250          16,800 
Construction (jobs, 000s) 133 131           134                138 
Annual change -2,400 -2,250        2,750            3,950 
 
Notes:  Absolute numbers are rounded to nearest 50. 
 
Unemployment 
We present our forecasts for unemployment in Scotland 
between 2011 and 2014 in central scenario in Table 5. We 
report both the “headline” unemployment measures, i.e. the 
measure used by the International Labour Organisation, as 
well as the numbers receiving unemployment benefits. The 
ILO measure is preferred as it gives a more full indication of 
the level of labour available for work in the economy, and so 
is a better measure of the level of spare labour capacity. It 
has been an interesting feature of the recent recession that 
the ILO measure of unemployment has increased 
significantly in both absolute and level terms, but the 
claimant count has responded more slowly. For example, 
the unemployment rate (those unemployed of working age 
as a portion of the working age economically active) on the 
ILO measure at the end of 2011 was 8.8%, up from 8.2% at 
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Table 4: Net employee jobs growth in Scotland in central, upper and lower forecasts, 2011 to 2014 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
Upper -37,400 -4,800 47,250  63,750 
Central -40,400 -16,000 23,200  38,000 
Lower -43,450 -27,700 -1,850  12,150 
 
Notes:  Absolute numbers are rounded to nearest 50.  
 
 
Table 5: Forecasts of Scottish unemployment in central forecast, 2011 to 2014 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
ILO unemployment 231,200 265,250 253,950 234,300 
Rate1 8.8% 9.8% 9.3% 8.8% 
Claimant count 141,500 164,450 177,750 166,350 
Rate2 5.3% 6.1% 6.5% 6.1% 
Notes:  Absolute numbers are rounded to nearest 50. 1 = rate calculated as total ILO unemployment divided by total of economically active 16+ 
population. 2 = rate calculated as claimant count divided by the sum of claimant count and total workforce jobs. The latest labour market figures 
are detailed in the Labour market section of the Fraser Economic Commentary. 
 
Our forecasted levels of unemployment for the end of 2012 
have been revised up from those made in November 2011, 
largely due to the worsening outlook in the Scottish labour 
market. Weaker than expected employment growth and 
increasing unemployment rates appear to suggest that the 
labour market in Scotland is underperforming compared to 
other regions across the UK. Our forecast for unemployment 
on the ILO measure at the end of 2012 is now 265,250, up 
34 thousand from the level seen at the end of 2011. As with 
our last forecast, we are expected the unemployment 
position to improve through 2013, and are now forecasting 
unemployment at the end of that year of 253,950. 
 
As discussed earlier, we have some concerns about the 
reported employee jobs series perhaps overestimating the 
growth through 2011. If these are subject to later revisions, 
and removed from the series, then the employment levels 
could be significantly worse than the current statistics 
suggest. 
 
We are forecasting that the rate of unemployment at the end 
of 2012 will be 9.8%, up significantly from our earlier 
forecasts. It appears from the latest data that employment 
growth has been weaker in Scotland than other regions, 
reducing the pull of labour into employment. We show the 
history and forecasted values for the ILO unemployment 
rate and claimant count rate from 1992 to 2014 in Figure 6. 
____________________ 
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Review of Scottish 
Business Surveys  
 
 
 
Overall 
Well into January 2012 surveys of Scottish business, 
in common with UK and European surveys, continued 
to highlight ongoing and deepening concerns as to the 
sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone. These, together 
with continuing fears of recession, with more signs of 
a slowdown both in the UK and internationally, 
forecasts of lower rates of growth in 2012, continuing 
consumer insecurity and pressures on household 
spending continued to dampen business confidence 
and activity.  However, amongst the latest UK wide 
surveys there are some tentative suggestions that 
activity, outside the construction and retail sectors, 
was lowest in October/November, as reflected in the 
fourth quarter UK results, but has picked up since 
then. The latest UK PMI for January reported an 
increase in the service sector, at the fastest rate since 
March 2011. But it remains unclear if this echoes last 
year, with good survey figures for the first quarter, but 
fading later in the year as the headwinds facing the 
UK economy remain, or represents the first signs of a 
more permanent upward trend.  
 
Both the Lloyds TSB Scotland Business Monitor (Q4 
2011) and the Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey 
(Q4 2011) noted the signs of the fragile recovery in 
the first half of 2011 were less evident by the end of 
2011. The Business Monitor indicated that the already 
muted recovery in the Scottish economy had stalled. 
‘There is every indication of an already low recovery 
slowing further to the point where growth is negligible 
or non existent.’ The Scottish Chambers’ survey noted 
‘demand remains weak as a combination of 
uncertainty, limited access to capital, reduced 
household income limits business activity and restricts 
plans for the future. The continuing concerns as to the 
future of the eurozone, the impact of government 
spending cuts and reorganisation of public services 
continue to adversely influence both activity and 
sentiment in Scotland and in the rest of the United 
Kingdom. ’It concluded, at the beginning of 2011 we 
noted ‘Rising price pressures and weak demand seem 
set to continue in the service sector, for many Scottish 
businesses the combination of limited improvements 
in turnover, rising costs, pressures on margins and 
declining trends in profitability will pose real problems 
in 2011’ at the end of 2011 we see little evidence in 
the results to change this view, if anything, our 
concerns for 2012 are greater and threat of recession 
more apparent. 
Oil and Gas services 
Through much of 2011 international prospects 
remained positive with expectations of increased 
capital spending on both exploration and production 
with continued expansion of deep water reserves and 
unconventional sources.  However, the International 
Energy Agency noted that oil demand fell for the first 
time since the 2008 – 2009 global financial crises, a 
reflection of the slowing down in the major economies 
and a relatively mild winter. Once again expectations 
as to demand is affected by political uncertainties in 
the gulf, most notably the threat by Tehran to close 
the Strait of Hormuz, the EU ban on Iranian imports 
and the downside risks to the global economy and 
hence to oil demand.  
 
UK Government data suggest that the number of 
exploration and appraisal wells started in Q3 2011 
declined to 12 compared to 21 in Q3 2010, and 
Deloitte reported offshore drilling levels falling to the 
lowest level since 2003, however, these figures 
masked the approval of a larger number of significant 
development projects in 2011. A number of longer 
term reviews remain positive as to the level of activity 
in the UKCS. 
 
Within the UK confidence amongst operators and 
contractors remained stagnant, with little change 
evident in the first three quarters of 2011 (Oil and Gas 
UK Index Q3 2011). Both the Oil and Gas UK Index 
and Aberdeen & Grampian Chambers’ 15th Oil and 
Gas Survey (November 2011) reported respondents’ 
concerns focussing on wage rate escalation (higher 
than the UK average), cost inflation and staff 
shortages.  
 
Production 
Respondents from the Lloyds TSB Business Monitor 
(Q4 2011) reported that export activity appeared to 
have been severely affected by the global slowdown 
and the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone 
economies and, as a consequence, their assessment 
of prospects over the next six months has 
deteriorated. Production firms were marginally less 
pessimistic than services with a net balance of -12% 
compared to services with a net balance of -14%. 
Expectations for the volume of repeat business over 
the next quarter fell to an overall net balance of -11% 
compared to -5% of the previous quarter and the -4% 
of the same quarter one year ago. Expectations for 
the volume of new business are slightly better at -7%. 
This is only marginally worse than the -6% of the 
previous quarter and the -5% of the same quarter one 
year ago. 
 
Manufacturing 
The Index of Manufactured exports for the third 
quarter of 2011 indicated that exports grew by only 
0.2% (compared to 1.1% over the second quarter) 
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and on an annual basis grew by 2.7%. Drink, Metal 
Products, Other Manufacturing and Mechanical 
Engineering registered rises over the quarter.  Whilst 
most business surveys differed in their interpretation 
of trends, there was more agreement in surveys in the 
final quarter of 2011 of a slowing down in activity. The 
Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) conducted by The 
Bank of Scotland concluded that the Scottish 
economy witnessed a slowdown in December and a 
pickup in the services sector compensated for falling 
output and export orders from a manufacturing sector 
affected by the slowdown in eurozone economies.  
Employment prospects in manufacturing continued to 
look favourable during September.  However, surveys 
for the first two months of 2012 have been slightly 
more positive. 
 
Scottish Chamber of Commerce Business Survey 
(SCBS) firms reported that business confidence 
remained low and weakened throughout the second 
half of 2011; and similarly the Scottish Engineering 
Review in its fourth quarter survey outlined that 
business confidence has now become negative. 
Similarly the CBI Industrial Trends Survey for Q4 2011 
reported that business optimism had ‘withered’ to its 
lowest level for three years. 
 
 Trends in total new orders became negative for 
respondents to The Scottish Engineering Review and 
SCBS firms reported that the trend in total new orders 
again eased in quarter four and the upward trend in 
total new sales ended. The trends in orders remained 
negative for the third consecutive quarter for CBI 
respondents.  For SCBS firms the outturn in total 
orders was worse than had been expected, the rising 
trend in export orders, a feature of the past four 
quarters, ended and respondents now anticipate a 
slight easing in export orders over quarter one 2012. 
The Scottish Engineering review also reported a 
downward trend in export orders although in general 
exports held up amongst larger companies.   
 
The CBI reported that for the first time in three years 
most firms intend to reduce expenditure across all four 
investment indicators.  SCBS firms claimed that 
although continuing to rise, trends in investment in 
plant/machinery remained weak during quarter four for 
a net balance of firms.   New investment was again 
mainly directed towards replacement or to improve. 
Capital investment plans among respondents to the 
Scottish Engineering Review rose for the sixth 
consecutive quarter. Small and medium companies 
remained more positive whereas large companies 
reported a flat trend. 
 
Employment trends eased among SCBS and CBI 
firms, although two thirds reported no change and 
remained upbeat for respondents to the Scottish 
Engineering Review.  
Construction 
Scottish Chambers’ construction respondents noted 
that for the fourth quarter of 2011 business confidence 
remained weak compared to a year ago although, 
given the harsh weather conditions at the ends of both 
2010 and 2011, comparisons are difficult. The latest 
Scottish Construction Monitor conducted by the 
Scottish Building Federation members (SBF) for Q3 
2011 reported that the general confidence rating 
declined by 13 points following a period of rising 
confidence, and a further decline was reported in Q4 
together with weak trends expected for 2012. They 
are attributing the decline to the prospects of 
significant cuts in public sector spending coupled with 
a stagnating private sector.  Similarly the Construction 
Industry Training Board in their report, Construction 
Skills concluded that the strong recovery seen in the 
Scottish construction industry in 2010 has proved to 
be short-lived, with an estimated decline of 3% in 
output for 2011 in real terms.’ The reason cited for this 
is the lower than anticipated activity in the private 
sector combined with the depressed public sector 
brought about by problems in the eurozone countries 
and the levels of debt. The report argued that given 
the scale of public expenditure cuts the public 
construction sectors held up in 2011 better than might 
have been expected.  
 
Scottish Chamber respondents reported that strong 
downward trends in orders had been anticipated for 
the fourth quarter of 2011, but worryingly the outturn 
was worse than had been expected. The decline in 
new contracts is expected to ease in Q1 2012, but it is 
unclear as to whether this is a pickup of work 
emanating from the series of winter storms or the 
beginnings of a recovery in activity. Over 80% of 
Chamber respondents reported working below 
capacity, and cash flow trends, turnover and 
profitability are all expected to be weak over the next 
12 months together with continued pressure on 
margins. Average capacity used, at 75% was 
marginally lower than Q3 although was higher 
compared to a year ago, when activity was disrupted 
due to the adverse weather.  The Construction 
Industry Training Board indicate that the concerns 
over prospective growth in the UK and Scotland will 
affect levels of private investment, therefore stunting 
growth in the private housing, industrial and 
commercial sectors in the short term. This, combined 
with likely public expenditure cuts will hit the public 
housing and public non-housing sectors hard, and the 
outlook for the house building sector is muted. The 
Construction Skills report is forecasting 2012 as  
another year of declining output overall with growth 
not expected to return to the sector until 2013. 
 
Scottish Chamber firms reported that the downward 
trend in employment accelerated in Q4 and that once 
again no recruitment difficulties were evident.   The 
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Scottish Construction Monitor focused on the 
recruitment of apprentices and concluded that firms 
are anticipating recruiting few apprentices over the 
course of 2012.  Construction Skills, on the other 
hand, forecast that construction employment in 
Scotland is expected to grow at an annual average 
rate of 1.1%.  
 
The service sector 
The Lloyds TSB Scottish Business Monitor (Q 4 
2011), reported continued weak trends in terms of the 
volume of new business (both new and repeat 
business) and expect little change to these trends 
over the next six months. 
 
Retail distribution 
As we have noted in earlier Commentaries recognition 
of the structural changes affecting the sector is critical 
in understanding the trends reported in retail surveys. 
A combination of a continued rise of internet sales 
(both with delivery and or collection at store bases), 
drift towards out of town centres and away from 
secondary city areas and increased price competition 
between the major retailers have contributed to 
changes in the high street shopping landscape, with 
slower growth in some areas but declines in others. 
Whilst the Retail Sales Index for Scotland Q4 2011 
noted the volume of retail sales grew by 0.7% in Q4 
2011 and by 0.7% annually (seasonally adjusted). The 
value grew by 0.8% in Q 4 2011 and by 3.5% annually 
(both at constant prices), both the Scottish Retail 
Consortium and retail respondents to the Scottish 
Chambers’ survey reported harsh trading conditions. 
The Finance Secretary, in commenting on the Retail 
Sales index figures, suggested this reflected stronger 
consumer confidence in Scotland compared to Great 
Britain, rather than the ongoing structural changes. 
 
In contrast both the Scottish Retail Consortium and 
Scottish Chambers’ retail respondents reported poor 
sales trends through the fourth quarter. Weak sales 
trends had been reported by the Scottish Retail Sales 
Monitor through much of 2011. Sales in November 
2011 were 1.3% down on November 2010 (when they 
had increased by 3.4%) The Scottish Retail 
Consortium noted ‘This was the worst fall in total sales 
for any month since the survey began in 1999. Like-
for-like sales were 2.1% lower than a year ago, the 
worst since August and the sixth decline in the past 
seven months’. Evidence of considerable discounting 
and extensive promotions was evident in November 
and concerns as to weak sales trends in December 
were widespread with harsh retail conditions widely 
forecast. 
 
Comparisons between December’s 2011 and 2010 
sales reported by the Scottish Retail Sales Monitor 
were problematic given the marked differences in the 
weather. Sales in December 2011 whilst up 1.6% on 
December 2010 were reported as the worst 
December figures since the monitor began in 1999. 
Once again aggressive discounting, clearance sales 
and promotions were widespread. The SRC noted 
‘Sales growth revived to its highest since July but this 
still represented a real terms fall once inflation is 
allowed for. The Christmas boost was well below both 
what Scottish retailers hoped for and the UK-wide 
figures. It came largely from a last-minute surge in the 
week before Christmas, helped by discounts and the 
shopping opportunity presented by the Saturday 
Christmas Eve’ although profits warnings and cost 
cutting plans have been announced by a number of 
major retailers. More recent analysis by the Scottish 
retail Consortium suggest there was an 8.5% drop in 
foot fall (numbers shopping) in the three months to 
January.  
 
Concerns were raised as to the impact of sales growth 
lower than inflation on cash management, stock 
control and on jobs and investment. Both 
commentators and industry bodies have noted that 
margins have been hit so hard that retail health is 
considered now to be in a worse state than at the 
depths of the 2008 recession and 2012 will be a 
difficult year for retailers.  GVA Grimley (November 
2011) noted that up to a sixth of retail spaces in some 
Scottish towns are now empty, notwithstanding 
reductions in rental charges. They noted that 
traditional town centres as being less able to 
withstand the effects of economic decline – compared 
to out of town centres (quoted in the Herald 
24.11.2011). The annual shop vacancy report echoed 
these trends. The average national UK vacancy rate 
has risen from 3% in 2008 to 14.3% in 2011, with 
much higher levels in some Scottish towns reflecting a 
combination of insolvencies and national chains 
moving to out of town locations. There is much to 
suggest that vacancy rates will continue to rise, 
notwithstanding reductions in rental rates. 
 
Conditions in the retail sector among SCBS firms did 
not improved during the crucial fourth quarter with 
declining consumer confidence and sales trends, 
increasing competition, rising costs and declining 
margins. Sales trends weakened further with more 
than 80% reporting, and more than three quarters 
expecting a decline in the total value of sales.  Fewer 
than 10% of SCBS respondents reported or expect 
increased sales, as continuing concerns over 
consumer confidence remain evident.  Cost pressures 
remain intense with transport costs and pay 
settlements being more of a concern. Pressures on 
margins remain widespread with over two thirds 
expecting declining profitability and turnover over the 
next year.  Labour market activity continues to remain 
at historically low levels with no firms reporting or 
expecting to increase overall staff levels. The CBI’s 
Distributive Trades survey (UK wide) for January 
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likewise noted retail sales down sharply on January 
2011, with 44% reporting sales lower than in January 
2011 and a net of 10% anticipating lower sales in 
February compared to February 2011. Continued 
pressures on family budgets and low confidence 
amongst consumers were seen to be the factors 
underpinning these results. The Scottish Retail 
consortium (January 2012 sales) reported, 
notwithstanding widespread discounting, the worst 
monthly figures for a decade, down 1.5% on last year, 
and like for like figures 2.6% lower than a year ago. 
Modestly rising food sales were offset by weaker non 
food sales. 
 
Tourism 
Business confidence declined further in Q4 for SCBS 
hotels and was significantly lower compared to Q4 
2010 and to the lowest level since Q4 2008. The rising 
trend in total visitor numbers continued although 
weakened further and was better than had been 
anticipated.   
 
PKF reported (November) declining room yields in 
Scottish hotels and only a modest rise in occupancy 
rates to 69.8% - but with marked differences between 
the major Scottish cities, with Aberdeen and Inverness 
both recording increases in occupancy and room 
yields, whereas both Glasgow and Edinburgh reported 
declining trends. In common with other surveys the 
PKF report noted rate cutting to sustain occupancy 
levels, and increased concerns for those currently 
running high debt levels. Whitbread whilst reporting 
‘stalling growth’ in the UK hotel sector nevertheless 
reported increased like for like sales with its Premier 
Inn group reporting occupancy at 80.3%, well above 
the industry average. The rise of the budget hotel 
sector in recent years, with Premier Inn’s capacity of 
over 40,000 rooms (and with a growth target of 4000 
rooms and 13 restaurants in 2011) and Travelodge 
with over 32,000 rooms indicates the scale of change 
in the hotel sector and the increasing pressure on 
smaller and traditional hotels. 
 
Average occupancy declined for SCBS hotels (from 
75.4% to 56.8%) although was marginally better 
compared to the same quarter a year ago. The 
Scottish Guest House and B&B Occupancy Survey for 
November 2011 showed that both room and bed 
occupancy declined over the year.  The Scottish Self-
catering Occupancy Survey also reported a decline. 
The accountants PKF reported occupancy rates rose 
by 0.6% in Scotland compared to 1% in England. 
Their report noted that whilst room yields and 
occupancy declined in three and four star hotels in 
Glasgow and Edinburgh, Aberdeen hotels, possibly 
reflecting the more buoyant oil and gas sector, 
reported improved occupancy and yields.  
 
During the three months to the end of December, 
trends in bar/restaurant trade and for 
conference/function facilities continued to decline 
among SCBS hotels. Half of hotels reported reducing 
average room rates and the widespread pattern of 
‘special offers’ seems set to continue with more than 
half expecting to reduce room rates in Q1 2012. 
Three-quarters, compared to 84% in the previous 
quarter, reported that the lack of tourist demand 
remained the primary business constraint and almost 
a third noted competition. Poor transport infrastructure 
also remained a concern to hotels. 48% (compared to 
56% in the third quarter) sought to recruit staff. 
Employment trends, as forecast declined in quarter 
four but the declines were not as steep as had been 
expected. A net balance of 201% expect a further 
decline in quarter one 2012.  
 
Logistics and Wholesale 
Data from the Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey 
showed that the problems in the Scottish wholesale 
distribution sector continued. Business confidence 
amongst SCBS wholesale respondents eased 
marginally although again more than half of firms 
reported a decline in business confidence. Business 
confidence was once again considerably lower 
compared to one year ago. Firms in the third quarter 
survey had expected a decline in sales however the 
downward trend in sales trends eased in Q4.  More 
than 90% of SCBS wholesalers reported increased 
pressures from transport costs. Cost pressures 
generally increased during the three months to the 
end of December and remained historically high. More 
than 70% expect to increase prices over the next 
three months, and cash flow trends remain weak. 
Once again concerns over turnover eased slightly 
however profitability remains low. Once again most 
firms reported no change to investment plans; 
nevertheless there appears to have been a marginal 
improvement. Wholesale respondents continued to 
shed staff during Q4 although the rate of decline 
eased further. Fewer than a third sought to recruit 
staff; largely for replacement.   
 
Outlook 
The slowing down of the weak recovery in the UK and 
eurozone economies, coupled with continuing 
consumer insecurity and reduced domestic spending, 
and with the impact of government spending cuts 
again dampened business confidence and activity. 
The pickup in activity in construction in Q2 2011 
appeared short lived and continuing consumer 
uncertainty and reduced spending contributed to 
weaker results in retail and the closure of a number of 
retail groups. For a further quarter tourism benefited 
from some increase in the numbers of home visitors, 
but these have been sustained by widespread 
discounting. The corrosive effects of uncertainty both 
in Europe and at home coupled with weak consumer 
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confidence will combine to make 2012 a difficult year 
for Scotland. 
 
At the end of 2011 the trends in demand and activity 
in construction were largely unchanged from a year 
ago, with widespread declining trends and pressures 
on margins being widely reported, once again the 
exceptional weather conditions are likely to impact on 
trends, especially in the first quarter given the need for 
repair and renewal following the winter storms. In 
tourism the outturn was weaker than anticipated and 
little changed from a year ago.  
 
Structural changes continue to affect both the retail 
and tourism sectors and compound the difficulties in 
assessing the impact of the slowdown in economic 
activity on consumer spending. It is clear that the 
migration of retail outlets and consumers from 
traditional city and town high streets to out of town 
centres and internet based retailing is affecting retail 
activity, as is the widespread discounting and 
competition between the major supermarket groups. 
Equally the continued expansion of the number of 
budget hotel room numbers has contributed to more 
intense discounting of room rates in tourism. The 
impact of the Olympics on overall tourism numbers in 
the UK remains unclear, as is the impact on the 
Scottish tourism sector. However, there is much to 
suggest that weak consumer confidence and 
spending will continue at adversely affect these 
sectors through 2012. 
 
Bank of Scotland PMI data for January reported a 
moderate improvement in business conditions, with 
rates of growth marginally faster than in the previous 
survey period. However, export orders weakened, 
albeit at the lowest rate for four months. The Scottish 
economy was seen as ‘struggling to maintain growth 
momentum in the face of a global slowdown, but is, so 
far, avoiding a return to recession.’ The Lloyds TSB 
English Regional PMIs noted that Scotland’s growth in 
December was lower than all of the English regions, 
but unlike Wales and Nn. Ireland reported growth. In 
January Scottish growth was again better than Wales 
and Nn. Ireland, but again lower than all English 
regions except the South West. 
 
There is much to suggest in the surveys that labour 
market activity remained limited with the majority of 
respondents not varying overall employment levels, 
nevertheless, SCBS respondents reported declining 
employment trends in all sectors and all sectors 
expect these weak employment trends to continue.   
Recruitment difficulties remained at low levels in all 
sectors. Pay increases in 2011 were at historically low 
levels and well below the rate of inflation, implying real 
declines in household income. In Q4 2011 pay 
increases amongst SCBS respondents ranged from 
1.8% in manufacturing and construction, to 2.5% in 
retail and 3.5% in tourism, although were higher in the 
Scottish oil and gas sector.  
 
Cliff Lockyer/Eleanor Malloy 
February 2012 
____________________ 
 
Current trends in Scottish Business are regularly 
reported by a number of business surveys. This report 
draws on: 
 
1. Aberdeen & Grampian Chamber of 
Commerce Survey no 15 November 2011; 
 
2. The Confederation of British Industries 
Scottish Industrial Trends Survey for the 
fourth quarter 2011; 
 
3. Lloyds TSB Business Monitor for the quarter 
September 2011 – November 2011and 
expectations to May 2012; 
 
4. Lloyds TSB Commercial, England Regional 
PMIs for January 2012; 
 
5. Scottish Engineering’s Quarterly Reviews for 
the fourth quarter of 2011;  
 
6. The Bank of Scotland Markit Economics 
Regional Monthly Purchasing Managers’ 
Indices for November, December 2011 and 
January 2012; 
 
7. The Scottish Retail Consortium’s KPMG 
Monthly Scottish Retail Sales Monitors 
October, November and December 2011 and 
January 2012; 
 
8. The Scottish Chambers of Commerce 
Quarterly Business Survey report for the 
fourth quarter of 2011;  
 
9. Oil & Gas UK quarterly Index Q3 2011; 
 
10. Oil & Gas UK Economic Report 2011; 
 
11. ONS Retail sales Q 4 2011; 
 
12. Visit Scotland Occupancy Survey for October 
and November 2011; 
 
13. The Scottish Construction Monitor October 
2011; 
 
14. 2012-2016 Construction Skills Network 
Scotland. 
 
15. PKF Hotel Occupancy Report 2011
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Inevitably current interest in the Scottish labour market 
continues to focus on the levels and trends in employment 
and unemployment and again we return to these themes. In 
addition the UK Government has announced plans to 
‘radically reform employment relations’ (Vince Cable 
23.11.2011), in Scotland the proposals to introduce both a 
national police force and national fire service have been 
published.  Attention also focussed on the rates of pay and 
bonuses in the financial sector to the neglect of pay 
relativities, other changes in pay, earnings and pensions for 
other groups, the subject of industrial action within the public 
sector at the end of 2011.  
 
A radical reform of employment relations 
In November the Government announced proposals, 
partially building on the Reducing Workplace Disputes and 
Effectiveness consultation  conducted earlier in the year, 
and the announcement of a call for evidence as to the 
effectiveness of the current TUPE regulations, to reform 
employment relations.  Most notably in terms of further 
deregulation to ‘reduce the onerous and unnecessary 
demands on businesses’, to reduce the impact of those 
measures which currently dissuade employers from hiring 
new staff, to reduce the costs to employers of the current 
employment tribunal system and to make some changes to 
existing dismissals procedures. 
 
From April 2012 the qualifying period for unfair dismissal will 
be increased from one to two years. In addition changes to 
employment tribunal procedures are expected, these are 
likely to include measures which require all claims to initially 
be referred to the Arbitration and Conciliation Service before 
tribunal proceedings. There are proposals that employees 
would be required to pay a deposit to the tribunal before 
proceeding with a weak case is increased from £500 to 
£1000. There are changes to witness expenses which can 
result in the parties to the tribunal being directed to pay 
witness costs. Further proposed changes to tribunal 
procedures include an issue and listing fee, higher fees for 
those claiming more than £30,000, and a requirement for 
losing employers to reimburse fees.  Further proposals 
include reducing the consultation period for large scale 
redundancies from 90 to possibly 60 or even 30 days, 
together with a revised definition of ‘establishment’.  For 
smaller firms (ten or fewer employees) a no fault dismissal 
procedure has been suggested. 
 
The government has yet to issue a response to the 
consultation on proposed changes to family-related leave, 
flexible work and statutory holidays, although Cable's 
speech indicated an intention to proceed with the extension 
of the right to request flexible work to all employees, and to 
modernise new parents' rights. In addition there is to be a 
fundamental review of employment tribunal procedures and 
a consideration of proposals to reform workplace sickness 
and absence. 
 
Whilst Dr Cable spoke highly of the German system of 
employee relations, noting employee participation on 
management boards, his proposals for reform did not 
extend to supporting the other principles of the German 
system of employment relations, namely worker 
participation or even the moves to the extent of work 
protection in the UK to the levels currently enjoyed in 
Germany. The proposed reforms were thought to be 
unworkable according to a survey of employment lawyers 
(Law Society Gazette 15th December 2011), other criticisms 
included the concern that the reforms could lead to a ‘hire 
and fire’ culture and would be of limited help to small 
businesses. 
 
Pay levels, relativities and bonuses 
Since 2008 the rate of increase in earnings has slowed 
significantly from ‘an annual average of 4.2% in 2007, 3.9% 
in 2008, 1.7% in 2009 to 1.8% in 2010. In the year to June 
2011 real earning fell by almost 3.8%, this follows a fall of 
3.4% in the previous 12 months’ (Lansley, TUC Touchstone 
Extras 2011). A review of pay settlements recorded by 
Incomes Data Services in the year to September 2011 
noted that 98.8% of settlements were less than the RPI and 
some 63% were less than half the RPI inflations rate 
(Lansley, TUC Touchstone Extra). The CIPD Salary Survey 
covering January to June 2011 reported 77% of public 
sector, 55% of the voluntary sector and 52% of the private 
sector respondents reporting a pay freeze, and 4% of the 
public, 8% of the voluntary and 7% of the private sector 
respondents reporting pay cuts. The indications are that this 
pressure on real incomes will continue for several years. 
Lansley (2011) argues that the downward pressure on living 
standards is the result of five main factors: a continuing 
downward squeeze on pay rates, a worsening of working 
conditions, cuts in state spending and benefits and a 25% 
reduction in overtime hours. The latest CIPD survey data 
suggests some slight pick up in the percentage of private 
sector firms intending to increase pay, and at a slightly 
higher rate than that in the public sector. 
 
In contrast, and the subject of much wider publicity, has 
been the pay and bonus increases for senior executives, 
most notably in sectors where there is an element of public 
ownership. As Incomes Data Services notes median total 
earnings for the lead executive in FTSE 100 companies has 
risen five times more quickly than those of the average 
employee between 2000 and 2011 (Lansley), and this gap 
has continued to widen. A contributory factor has been the 
introduction of performance related pay elements, these 
averaged 328% of salary amongst FTSE 100 in 2010 (High 
Pay Commission) The High Pay Commission’s final report 
published in late 2011 noted the widening gap, amongst the 
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examples it gave included one bank which in 1979 top pay 
in was 14.5 times higher than the average employee it is 
now 75 times.  The report notes (see table 1) the shift in 
income distribution in recent years, it argues, that if present 
trends continue, by 2035 the top 0.1% will take home 14% 
of national income – equivalent to the pattern in Victorian 
Britain. Already the top 0.1% share of national income is 
higher than most other countries, except the USA. 
 
Table 1:  National income distribution in the UK 
 
Year Top 0.1% Top 1% Top 10% 
1979 1.3% 5.93% 28.4% 
2007 6.5% 14.5% 40% 
 
 
Source:  High Pay Commission (2011) Final Report p22 
 
The High Pay Commission only found evidence which 
challenged the link between pay and performance, they 
concluded: 
 
x Salary growth over the past ten years bears no 
relation to market capitalisation, earnings per share 
or pre tax profit; 
x There is little or no relation between total earnings 
trend and market capitalisation, salary growth; 
x A slightly closer relation seems evident between 
total earnings, pre-tax profit and earnings per 
share, but they do not mirror each other exactly 
and the trend diverges significantly during certain 
periods. 
 
The potential social consequences of increased inequalities 
in pay and earnings are fully discussed in the report. For 
those with longer memories there are parallels between the 
problems of payments by results (the performance and 
bonus schemes of the 1950s and 1960s) for manual 
workers with their wage inflationary consequences (see for 
example Research Paper No 11, Royal Commission on 
Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations 1968), and the 
rise of performance based pay in the 1990s. There is much 
to suggest, that with a few exceptions the problem with 
performance management pay systems is that the 
meaningful is rarely measured and the measurable is rarely 
meaningful, and in the consequence of executive payments 
the pay is measurable but the performance improvement is 
not. There are few examples of pay back schemes or 
penalties for non achievement. 
 
Notwithstanding the public concern as to executive pay 
rising youth unemployment has led to some criticisms that 
current minimum wage rates could be ‘crowding out’ young 
workers. At the Davos World Economic Forum debate one 
CEO (salary £900,000 and proposed 180% bonus) argued 
that the minimum wage legislation across Europe blocked 
young people from employment (As of October 2011 the 
minimum wage rates in UK are: £2.60 for year one 
apprentices; £3.68 for 16 – 17 year olds; £4.98 for 18 – 20 
year olds and £6.08 for those aged 21 and over).  More 
recently these ideas have resurfaced in the right wing of the 
Conservative party. 
 
The Supplementary Regional Labour Market Statistics 
(December 2011) indicated the unemployment rate for 18 – 
24 year olds was 23.5% for Scotland (October – December 
2011), an increase of 5.9 percentage points over the year to 
October 2011, however, the report notes that in July – 
September 2011 of the 84,000 people aged 18 – 24 who 
were unemployed in Scotland, approximately 27,000 are 
also in full time education.  About one in five unemployed 
young workers are those with low or no qualifications 
(NEETs), the hardest group to find employment. 
 
Recent trends and statistics  
Comparable figures on the labour market between Scotland 
and the United Kingdom in the quarter October - December 
2011 are summarised in Table 2. Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) data show that in the quarter to December the level of 
employment in Scotland fell by 20 thousand, to 2,458 
thousand. Over the year to December 2011, employment in 
Scotland fell by 28 thousand. For the same period, UK 
employment rose by 7 thousand. The Scottish employment 
rate (16 – 64) – those in employment as a percentage of the 
working age population – was 70.7 per cent, down 0.4 per 
cent compared to one year earlier.  For the same period the 
UK employment rate was 70.3 per cent, down 0.2 per cent 
compared to one year earlier. Scottish unemployment, in the 
quarter to December, rose by 16 thousand to 231 thousand, 
a rise of 15 thousand over the year.   
 
In considering employment, activity and unemployment 
rates it is important to remember the bases and 
relationships of these figures.  LFS data (estimated) is 
provided for: (1) all aged 16 and over and (2) for all aged 
59/64. The first measure (all aged 16 and over) leads to 
higher numbers in employment, in the total economically 
active and economically inactive – but reduces the 
economic activity rates and unemployment rates, but at the 
same time increases the economically inactive rate. 
Conversely the second measure (all aged 16 to 59/64) leads 
to lower numbers economically active, in employment and 
economically inactive – but leads to a higher economically 
active, employment and unemployment rates but lower 
economically inactive rates. Figures derived from the Labour 
Force Survey differ slightly from those derived from the 
Annual Population Survey. 
 
The relationships between employment, unemployment, 
totally economically active and inactive are important in 
appreciating changing levels of employment and 
unemployment, and changes in the employment rates 
should be seen in conjunction with changes in the activity 
rates.  If people leave employment and become 
unemployed (but are still economically active) the 
unemployment rate increases, but the economically active 
rate remains unchanged. However, if people leave 
employment and do not seek employment, as seems to be a 
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continuing pattern, they are categorised as economically 
inactive, as such the unemployment rate remains 
unchanged whilst the activity and inactivity rates change. 
Equally the changing pattern between full and part time 
employment is of interest and we return to this issue later in 
this section. This is clearly shown in table 2. Over the year 
to December 2011, the numbers employed fell by 28 
thousand, whilst unemployment rose by 15 thousand – and 
the numbers of those aged 16-59/64 who are economically 
inactive fell by 3 thousand and the numbers economically 
active rose by 4 thousand. 
 
Table 2 shows that for Scotland the preferred International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) measure of unemployment rose 
to 231 thousand, between October – December 2011, a rise 
of 15 thousand over the year. The ILO unemployment rate 
rose in the three months to December 2011 and now stands 
at 8.6 per cent. This represents a 0.6 per cent rise over the 
last quarter and a 0.6 per cent rise relative to the same 
period a year earlier. The comparable ILO unemployment 
rate for the UK stands at 8.4 per cent, and is up 0.1 per cent 
over the most recent quarter and also up 0.5 per cent over 
the year.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the trend in unemployment in Scotland 
since 1992. Unemployment peaked in October – December 
1992 at 268,000, it took almost five years - to August - 
October 1997 - to be consistently below 200,000 and a 
further five and a half years - to February – April 2003 - to 
be below 150,000 and reached the lowest number (111,000) 
in May – June 2008. If the same pattern is repeated, and 
unemployment does not rise in future months, then it may 
take approximately three years for unemployment to fall 
below 200,000. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Trend in Scottish unemployment 1992 – December 2011 (thousands) 
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Source: Labour Market Statistics (First Release), Scotland and UK, February 2012 
 
 
The economically active workforce includes those 
individuals actively seeking employment and those currently 
in employment (i.e. self-employed, government employed, 
unpaid family workers and those on training programmes). 
Between October – December 2011 the numbers 
economically active (16+) fell 4 thousand and the activity 
rate fell by 0.2 to 62.9%. There were 2,689 thousand 
economically active people in Scotland during October - 
December 2011. This comprised 2,458 thousand in 
employment (2,406 thousand aged 16 – 64) and 231 
thousand ILO unemployed. The level for those of working 
age but economically inactive fell by 2 thousand in the latest 
quarter, and fell by 3 thousand over the year thousand to 
775 thousand people; this indicates a fall of 0.4 per cent in 
the number of people of working age economically inactive 
over the last year.  
 
Data on employment by age, derived from the Annual 
Population Survey, is available up to June 2011. In the year 
to June 2011 employment rates fell for those aged 18 – 24 
and those aged over 50, with the employment rate for those 
aged 16 – 64 falling by 0.1 percentage points and with the 
largest percentage point falls being recorded for those aged 
50 - 64 (down 1.1%). Employment rates for women again 
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Table 2:  Headline indicators of Scottish and UK labour market, Oct - December 2011 (thousands) 
 
 
Oct - Dec 2011  Scotland 
Change 
on 
quarter 
Change 
on 
year 
United 
Kingdom 
Change  
on  
quarter 
Change 
on 
year 
Employment* 
 
Level (000s) 2,458 -20 -28 29,129  60 7 
Rate (%) 70.7 -0.4 -0.4 70.3 0.1 -0.2 
Unemployment** Level (000s)          231 16 15 2,671  48 179 
Rate (%) 8.6 0.6 0.6 8.4 0.1 0.5 
 
Inactivity*** 
 
Level (000s)        766 -2 -3 9,286 -78 -73 
Rate (%) 22.5 0.0 -0.1       23.1  -0.2 -0.2 
 
 
Source:  Labour Market Statistics (First Release), Scotland and UK, February 2012  
  * Levels are for those aged 16+, while rates are for those of working age (16-59/64) 
 ** Levels and rates are for those aged 16+, rates are proportion of economically active. 
*** Levels and rates for those of working age (16-59/64) 
 
 
Table 3:  Employment rates thousands (%) People by age for the four years July 2007 - Jun 2008 to Jul 
2010 – Jun 2011 
 
 All 16+ 16 - 64 16 - 17 18 - 24 25 - 34 35 - 49 50 - 64 65+ 
Jul 2007 - Jun 2008 60.8 74.2 39.4 68.5 81.6 83.9 65.5 5.7 
Jul 2008 - Jun 2009 59.8 72.8 38.0 65.9 80.3 82.3 64.8 6.6 
Jul 2009 - Jun 2010 58.2 71.0 30.4 62.2 78.3 81.0 64.4 6.4 
Jul 2010 - Jun 2011 58.0 70.9 33.6 61.2 79.0 81.6 63.3 6.6 
 
Source:  Labour Market Statistics (First Release), Scotland and UK, February 2012  
 
fell more than those for men, except for those aged 50 – 64. 
Table 3 illustrates the changing employment rates by age 
group for the four years April - March 2008 – 2011 and 
illustrates consistent declines across all age groups, except 
16 – 17 year olds.  
 
In the year to December 2011 (the latest available data) 
inactivity amongst 16 – 64 fell by 3 thousand a 0.3% 
decrease over the year and the inactivity rate (16 – 64) 
stood at 22.5%. Inactivity for men aged 16 – 64 fell by 8 
thousand (2.5%) over the last quarter and by 13 thousand 
(4.9% over the year). Inactivity for women was unchanged 
over the past quarter but fell by 600 over the year.   
 
In the year to June 2011 inactivity fell by 1 thousand to 783 
thousand. The main increases reported for the reasons for 
inactivity over the year were: retired up 9 thousand and long 
term sick up 9 thousand. The numbers looking after family 
and home rose by 3 thousand and those temporarily sick fell 
by 2 thousand. The majority 590 thousand did not want a 
job – but 193 thousand were inactive but wanted 
employment. 
 
The most recent (seasonally adjusted) figure for Jobseekers 
allowance claimants (16+) in Scotland stood at 148.2 
thousand in January  2012, up 2 thousand or 1.4% over the 
year (these figures are taken from table 8 in the Labour 
Market Statistics [First Release] February 2012. The 
claimant count rate at January 2012 stood at 5.3 per cent, or 
6.8% for men and 3.5% for women (note these figures are 
taken from table 7 in the Labour Market Statistics [First 
Release] February 2012 figures and measures the number 
of claimants on the second Thursday of each month). The 
latest unemployment data at the Scottish constituency level 
is available in a SPICe Briefing.  
 
Table 4 indicates the continuing significant differences in 
employment, unemployment and inactivity rates at the local 
authority level. However, between 2008 and 2009 the gap 
between the areas with the highest and lowest employment 
rates widened by 5.8 percentage points. In the year July 
2010 – June 2011 employment rates varied from over 80% 
in Shetland to between 65 - 70% in ten local authority areas 
and below 65% in two local authority areas. Likewise 
unemployment rates were again lowest in Aberdeenshire, 
Orkney and Shetland and highest, 11.8%, in North Ayrshire.
FEBRUARY 2012 PAGE 47 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
Table 4:  Employment, unemployment and inactivity rates by Local Authority Area 2007, 2008 and July 2010 
– June 2011 (%) 
 
Geography  
(Residence Based) 
Employment rates   Unemployment rates 16+*    Economic inactivity rates 
2007 2008 
Jul 
2010/ 
Jun 
2011 2007 2008 
Jul 
2010/ 
Jun 
2011 2007 2008 
Jul 
2010/ 
Jun 
2011 
Scotland 76.0 75.6 70.9 4.7 4.9 7.8 20.1 20.3 23.0 
Local Authority Area          
Aberdeen City 79.1 79.4 75.4 3.7 3.6 5.3 17.3 17.6 19.6 
Aberdeenshire 82.6 82.2 79.7 2.5 2.6 4.0 15.6 15.5 16.4 
Angus 79.1 80.0 72.3 4.5 4.6 7.1 16.2 15.6 21.1 
Argyll & Bute 80.0 77.6 73.9 4.0 4.3 6.2 16.3 18.4 21.4 
Clackmannanshire 69.4 70.9 72.5 5.5 5.4 8.6 25.3 25.4 22.5 
Dumfries and Galloway 77.4 76.2 69.6 4.2 4.5 6.8 19.1 19.5 24.5 
Dundee City 72.1 71.5 71.7 6.6 6.3 8.6 22.4 23.9 22.3 
East Ayrshire 73.1 74.6 68.5 6.3 6.1 9.9 21.5 20.4 24.2 
East Dunbartonshire 78.9 77.6 71.7 3.1 3.9 5.9 19.0 18.7 23.7 
East Lothian 79.2 77.9 71.5 3.5 3.5 7.1 18.0 19.4 22.6 
East Renfrewshire 77.2 76.5 72.2 3.4 3.6 5.6 19.1 20.5 22.6 
Edinburgh, City of 77.4 76.6 72.1 4.3 4.5 6.3 19.5 19.8 23.2 
Eilean Siar  79.4 78.7 65.9 4.2 4.6 6.8 17.7 16.3 31.1 
Falkirk 78.1 78.9 72.9 4.6 4.4 8.0 18.5 18.3 21.2 
Fife 75.9 76.5 71.7 5.6 5.8 9.0 18.8 17.7 20.5 
Glasgow City 66.9 66.6 62.1 6.8 6.9 11.3 28.2 28.8 29.2 
Highland 82.0 81.7 78.0 3.2 3.5 5.1 16.0 16.3 18.6 
Inverclyde 68.4 72.5 70.3 7.1 6.4 9.0 24.8 23.0 22.9 
Midlothian 80.7 79.9 72.9 4.2 4.2 7.7 15.1 16.2 20.5 
Moray 80.4 81.8 78.7 3.5 3.8 4.9 17.2 15.0 18.8 
North Ayrshire 71.5 71.8 62.8 6.4 7.4 11.8 23.5 22.0 28.2 
North Lanarkshire 73.2 71.0 68.8 5.4 5.9 10.3 22.6 23.8 22.9 
Orkney Islands 86.4 83.9 78.6 2.7 2.9 4.0 11.2 14.2 17.8 
Perth and Kinross 78.1 78.7 75.6 3.5 3.7 5.0 18.8 17.9 20.7 
Renfrewshire 75.0 76.0 66.6 5.1 5.5 9.5 20.9 18.9 26.0 
Scottish Borders 81.4 80.6 73.7 3.1 3.6 5.7 16.2 15.8 22.2 
Shetland Islands 88.1 88.0 85.1 2.6 2.8 3.5 10.4 10.8 13.8 
South Ayrshire 77.2 75.4 67.1 5.0 5.4 8.9 18.9 20.5 25.5 
South Lanarkshire 78.9 76.7 71.5 4.2 4.4 7.6 18.5 20.6 24.4 
Stirling 76.8 75.2 69.3 3.9 4.5 7.1 19.2 20.2 24.6 
West Dunbartonshire 73.9 71.2 68.6 6.3 6.9 10.8 20.8 23.3 22.8 
West Lothian 77.8 79.1 72.7 4.8 4.6 7.6 17.7 17.4 21.9 
 
Source:  2007 and 2008 data from Annual Population Survey (Jan to Dec)  
               July 2010 – June 2011data from Labour Market Statistics (First Release), Scotland and UK, February 2012 (Source  Annual  
 Population survey, Job Centre Plus administrative system and Annual Business Inquiry) 
Notes:  See sources for definitions and original sources  
 
and 11.3% in Glasgow, and inactivity rates were highest in 
Eilean Star and Glasgow City  
 
The most recent figures for the number of workforce jobs by 
industrial activity are detailed in Table 5. Total workforce job 
figures are a measure of jobs rather than people. Total 
seasonally adjusted workforcee jobs for the quarter ending 
September 2011 (the latest available figures) stood at 2,611 
thousand 2,272 thousand employee jobs, 323 thousand self 
employed jobs, HM forces and supported trainees 16 
thousand) although it is necessary to note significant recent 
revisions to the 2009 and 2010 figures noted in the 
November 2011 Commentary. Table 5 provides some 
indication of both the impact of the recession and the 
recovery on sectors, although the trends need to be 
considered with some caution.  Over the year to September 
2011 the most significant job losses have occurred in 
agriculture (11.2%), construction (15.2%), transport and 
storage (15.9%)  and accommodation & food service 
activities (17.8%), in contrast the declines in the service 
sector have been more modest – finance & insurance 
(5.9%), public admin etc (-4.4%) and education (3.4%). 
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Table 5:  Total workforce jobs* by industry, Scotland, June 2005–2011 and Sept 2011 (thousands) 
 
Industry June 2005 
June 
2006 
June 
2007 
June 
2008 
June 
2009 
June 
2010 
June 
2011 
Sept 
2011 
A : Agriculture, forestry and fishing 51 54 60 60 59 62 55 53 
B : Mining and quarrying 25 28 30 30 29 27 29 30 
C : Manufacturing 233 226 228 212 201 181 176 172 
D : Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 10 10 13 16 19 19 20 19 
E : Water supply; sewerage, waste management etc 16 18 17 16 14 14 15 14 
F : Construction 181 194 203 199 185 188 172 165 
G : Wholesale & retail trade; repair of motor vehicles   
etc 382 384 380 396 398 363 
389 397 
H : Transportation and storage 125 118 123 123 111 140 113 117 
I : Accommodation and food service activities 189 190 188 191 186 197 180 175 
J : Information and communication 72 73 79 69 68 75 67 69 
K : Financial and insurance activities 114 107 91 98 100 95 96 93 
L : Real estate activities 25 29 30 32 32 23 29 32 
M : Professional, scientific and technical activities 145 154 161 176 174 157 174 187 
N : Administrative and support service activities 174 180 192 200 185 176 172 181 
O : Public administration & defence; social security 180 177 181 177 146 145 139 138 
P : Education 199 200 192 208 208 197 210 201 
Q : Human health and social work activities 384 399 383 398 401 375 431 431 
R : Arts, entertainment and recreation 75 81 75 84 71 72 71 71 
S : Other service activities 63 65 63 58 59 67 65 65 
Column Total 2,644 2,685 2,690 2,740 2,651 2,571 2600 2611 
 
Source:  Labour Market Statistics (First Release), Scotland, February 2012 
 *    Workforce jobs are a measure of jobs rather than people 
Note: There have been considerable revisions to the June 2009 and June 2010 from previous figures and as of September 2011 ONS are 
 highlighting figures with a coefficient of variation greater than 25% 
 
Table 6 outlines the changing patterns of full time and part 
time employment, and highlights the growth in the numbers 
of part time workers in Scotland, the latest data (July 2010 – 
June 2011), indicates that since the peak in employment  
(October 2007 – September 2008) total employment 
(employees, self employed, unpaid family workers and 
those on government supported training and employment 
programmes) has fallen by 81 thousand. Table 6 indicates 
the numbers of full time workers in Scotland since the peak 
in employment have declined by 122 thousand whilst part 
time employment numbers recovered very quickly and are 
now 40 thousand higher. The changing trends in full and 
part time employment since October 2007 – September 
2008 are shown in figure 2. The number of self employed is 
now 3 thousand above that reported in October 2007 – 
September 2008, suggesting some substitution of self 
employment for employment. The number of those working 
part time because they could not find a full time job is 51 
thousand higher than the peak in employment, suggesting 
that increasing numbers of workers were taking part time 
employment in the absence of full time work (the same 
argument applies to temporary work). Interestingly, and 
once again a comparison of tables 3 in the first release for 
Scotland and for the UK figures suggests that, in relative 
terms, the decline in full time employment has been greater 
in Scotland than in the UK, but in contrast the growth in part 
time employment, in relative terms, has been greater 
suggesting that the relative ‘better’ performance in 
employment in Scotland in recent quarters has been fuelled 
by a growth in part time employment, as a comparison of 
FTEs would suggest. The relative growth in the numbers of 
self employed has been greater in the UK than in Scotland. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates that full time employment is still 3.66 
percentage points below the level before the recession, 
whilst part time employment is 6.44 percentage points 
higher than that recorded before the recession.  It clearly 
shows how the employment ‘recovery’ has been driven 
more by an increase in part time employment. 
 
Table 7, drawing on the Annual Population Survey, attempts 
to explore how the pattern of jobs has changed since the 
onset of the recession, it suggests a growth in the numbers 
employed in personal service, sales and customer service 
and elementary occupations, and some decline in 
managerial, professional (but a slight rise in associate 
professional and technical occupations), and process, plant 
and machine operatives. The spate of recent mergers in the 
professional services sector reflects the downturn in activity 
and suggests further losses in these sectors. This pattern 
would resonate with trend in increasing numbers of part time 
employees, but raises some concerns as to the potential 
availability of sufficient skills to sustain a recovery.
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Table 6:  Trends in total, full, part time, temporary and part time who could not find a full time job 
 
 All in employment 
Scotland Total1 
Employ-
ees1 
Self 
employed1 
Full- 
time 
workers2 
Part- 
time 
workers2 
Workers  
with 
second 
jobs 
Temp- 
orary 
employees 
Could 
not find 
full time 
job 
         
Jan 2007 - Dec 2007 2,525 2,244 263 1,892 631 93 128 60 
Apr 2007 - Mar 2008 2,533 2,248 267 1,900 630 96 126 60 
Jul 2007 - Jun 2008 2,544 2,254 271 1,912 629 98 125 61 
Oct 2007 - Sep 2008 2,550 2,262 269 1,916 631 98 119 61 
Jan 2008 - Dec 2008 2,529 2,243 268 1,900 626 99 116 64 
Apr 2008 - Mar 2009 2,527 2,245 267 1,899 624 101 117 65 
Jul 2008 - Jun 2009 2,515 2,235 264 1,880 632 103 123 73 
Oct 2008 - Sep 2009 2,503 2,220 265 1,856 644 102 127 81 
Jan 2009 - Dec 2009 2,492 2,211 265 1,844 645 102 133 84 
Apr 2009 - Mar 2010 2,470 2,185 267 1,815 652 101 132 90 
Jul 2009 - Jun 2010 2,462 2,179 265 1,802 656 99 126 96 
Oct 2009 - Sep 2010 2,466 2,183 264 1,798 663 98 127 99 
Jan 2010 - Dec 2010 2,469 2,181 268 1,793 671 97 124 106 
Apr 2010 - Mar 2011 2,471 2,182 270 1,796 670 97 125 110 
Jul 2010 – Jun 2011 2,469 2,179 274 1,794 671 95 131 113 
 
Source:  Labour Market Statistics (First Release), Scotland, February 2012 
Note: 1. Includes people who did not state whether they worked part time or full time 
 2. The split between full time and part time employment is based on respondents’ self classification 
 
 
Figure 2:  Trends in full time and part time employment since October 2007 – September 2008 (October 
2007 – September 2008 = 100) 
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Table 7:  Trends in employment by Standard Occupational Classification 
 
  
Jul 07  
Jun08 
Jul 08 
Jun 09 
Jul 09 J 
un 10 Jul 10 - Jun 11 
 
percent percent percent percent number 
Managers and senior officials 13.0 13.5 13.3 13.1 323,800 
Professional occupations 12.9 13.4 12.7 13.3 329,300 
Associate Prof & Tech occupations 14.7 14.7 14.7 15.1 372,300 
Administrative and secretarial occupations 11.4 11.3 11.3 10.6 260,700 
Skilled trades occupations 11.5 11.4 11.3 11.0 272,000 
Personal service occupations 9.1 8.8 9.3 9.6 235,900 
Sales and customer service occupations 8.1 8.0 8.4 8.5 210,600 
Process, plant and machine operatives 7.3 7.2 6.8 6.8 167,500 
Elementary occupations 11.6 11.6 11.9 11.8 290,300 
 
Source:  Labour Force Survey 
 
Table 8 provides some limited indications of the experience 
of unemployment in terms of claimant count by age and 
duration. The latest figures suggest that 29.6 thousand have 
been claiming benefit for more than a year, up 8,900 over 
the year and 7.4 thousand have been claiming for more than 
2 years, up 2.6 thousand over the year. 
Tables 7 and 8 of the Labour Market statistics (first release) 
provide information of the claimant count. The figure 
forJanuary indicates a total of 148.2 thousand claimants, up 
12 thousand for the year. Of interest are the differing trends 
in the claimant count for men and women. The claimant 
count for men, 104.3 thousand was down 1.9 thousand over 
the year, whereas the comparable figure for women, 43.9 
thousand, was 3.9 thousand higher than a year ago. 
 
Trends in public sector employment are now considered in
 
 
Table 8:  Total claimant count and computerised claims by age and duration (Numbers and percentage 
change over year to January 2012) 
 
 All computerised 
claims 
All computerised 
claims Up to 6 
months 
All computerised 
claims Over 6 and 
up to 12 months  
All computerised 
claims All over 12 
months 
All 16+ numbers 147,800 86,900 31,300 29,600 
All 16+ % change over year 1.9% -11.7 21.1 42.7 
All 18 – 24   42,300 28,600 9,500 4,200 
All 25- 49   81,100 45,900 17,200 23,500 
All 50 and above  23,400 12,400 4,600 6,400 
 
 
Source:  Labour Market Statistics (First Release), Scotland, February 2012 
 
more detail a separate section in the Commentary. As the 
section indicates public sector employment in Scotland 
continues to decline. The latest data (Q3 2011) indicates 
that there were 588,900 employed in the public sector in 
Scotland, a decrease of 23,500 (3.8%) since Q3 2010. 
Employment in the devolved public sector declined by 
21,200 (4.1%) to 492,000, due mainly to a decline in local 
government employment (down 13,300 over the year). 
Public sector employment (headcount and excluding public 
sector financial institutions) is now at its lowest since Q4 
2001 and in percentage terms the lowest in the current data 
set (1999 - 2011). 
 
More significantly the current freeze on public sector pay 
with a cap of 1% on the average pay increase for 2013 – 
2014 (announced in the Chancellor’s autumn statement) 
together with proposals to link public sector pay to local 
labour markets coupled with the current increase pension 
contributions and proposals to change pension 
arrangements led to widespread industrial action towards 
the end of 2011, and is likely to contribute to further 
industrial action. 
 
In the longer term the changing relationship between public 
and private sector pay will be increasingly significant, 
already there are some indications that specialist public 
sector staff are reacting to the current pay freeze by moving 
to the private sector. Previous eras of pay restraint in the 
public sector which have reduced earnings relative to the 
private sector have led to subsequent ‘high’ increases 
and/or to periods of industrial action
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Figure 3:  Total weekly earnings UK private and public sector 2001 – 2011 
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Source:  Labour Market Statistics (First Release), Scotland, February 2012 
 
 
Outlook  
Over the past year total employment declined by 28,000 and 
unemployment rose by 15,000.  The declines in public 
sector employment were not offset by rising private sector 
employment.  All the indications are that unemployment will 
continue to rise through 2012.  As we have noted in 
previous Commentaries any recovery in employment is 
likely to be slow and limited. Reducing unemploy-
ment/increasing activity rates for areas with a history of 
higher levels of unemployment will be particularly difficult 
and harder than in the past given the changing landscape of 
local and central government services. 
 
____________________ 
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Public Sector 
employment in 
Scotland 
 
 
Some 300,000 public sector workers in Scotland 
participated in the UK wide public sector strike at the end of 
November 2011, in response to plans to change pension 
arrangements, pension links to the CPI, retirement age and 
contributions.  The Government announced a revised 
arrangement, broadly, although not universally accepted, on 
20th December. 
 
Public sector employment in Scotland continues to decline. 
The latest data (Q3 2011) indicates that there were 588,900 
(546,000 excluding public sector financial institutions) 
employed in the public sector in Scotland, a decrease of 
23,500 (3.8%) since Q3 2010. Employment in the devolved 
public sector declined by 21,200 (4.1%) to 492,000, due 
mainly to a decline in local government employment (down 
13,300 over the year). Public sector employment 
(headcount and excluding public sector financial institutions) 
is now at its lowest since Q4 2001 and in percentage terms 
the lowest in the current data set (1999 - 2011). 
 
As Table 1 and Figure 1 indicate public sector employment 
(excluding public sector financial institutions) rose between 
1999 and 2006, but since 2007 has declined by 42,600. 
Although the movement of local authority staff both in and 
out of arms length organizations, typically charities, makes 
comparisons slightly harder. 
 
Local Government 
Table 2 indicates the changes in headcount by local 
authority and indicates a both decline in Local Authority 
employment of 13,300 (4.5%) over the year, and some 
evidence of acceleration in the rate of reduction in 
employment. Attempts to rely on voluntary measures and 
natural wastage may prove to be lower than expected, as 
normally turnover rates ease during a recession, there will 
be more pressure on other methods to reduce employment 
levels. Pressures on spending levels will lead to 
employment reductions. Evidence as to changes in 
organization and employment policies in Local Government 
in England suggests a number of approaches to reducing 
labour costs that may well be adopted in Scotland (Work in 
Progress (December 2011), The Audit Commission. 
December 2011). These included:  
 
x The potential for localising pay rates to reflect local 
market conditions;  
x Increased emphasis on part time working – 
especially for those approaching retirement; 
x Less spending on external expert services;  
x Reduced use of agency staffs;  
x De-layering with an emphasis on cutting more 
heavily management and senior posts (but 
recognising the potential loss of organizational 
memory on efficiency);  
x The outsourcing services at reduced costs to 
voluntary and other associations as well as to 
commercial organizations;  
x The ending of automatic annual pay increments. 
 
The policies of contracting out local government services to 
the voluntary sector have meant that cuts in local 
government expenditure have impacted on the voluntary 
sector. As Cunningham (2011) notes the voluntary sector 
had been subject to a number of cost pressures in the New 
Labour Era, leading to job insecurity and pressure on terms 
of employment, and voluntary organisations were 
increasingly unable to match public sector salary scales. 
The current era of public sector cuts increases the pressure 
on voluntary sector organisations to reduce costs, 
Cunningham notes that already some local authorities have 
imposed cuts on providers ranging between 4% and 20%.  
The report noted that 36% of organisations surveyed had 
seen a decrease in their annual turnover over the past three 
years; over half had reported no cost of living increases in 
their contracts (68%) or their grants (98%). As a 
consequence pay freezes have been widespread, there 
have been some wage cuts, but more generally 
organisations were seeking to reduce wage costs by 
reducing training, deskilling, cuts to terms and conditions 
and reduced hours of work. 
 
Education 
Changes to the terms and conditions of supply teachers 
(supply staff have to work for five days at the lowest daily 
rate of £78 for five consecutive days in the same school 
before pay rises to the normal rate of £145), designed to 
save some £60 million lead to councils experiencing 
considerable problems In meeting both short and long term 
supply cover.  A study Scottish Labour found that 84% of 
local authorities could not meet all requests for short term 
cover in 2011/2012 and 52% experienced difficulties in filling 
long term requests. Inevitably this will lead to further 
numbers of teachers in non permanent posts considering 
whether or not to remain in the sector. 
 
Within the education sector the numbers employed in 
Scottish Further education colleges had declined by 2,000 
(11.8%) over the year to Q3 2011 to 15,100) and further 
reductions are inevitable. The publication of the Scottish 
Government’s Reform of Post 16 Education and subsequent 
consultation paper outlined the Government’s proposals for 
a very rapid restructuring of 35 colleges into 12 regions with 
a programme of mergers, collaboration, sharing services 
and courses. Four different structures for the regional model 
were outlined in the consultation paper: full mergers, 
regional federations of colleges, lead colleges with
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Table 1:  Number of people employed in Scotland (headcount) 
 
  
  
  
  
Total 
Employment 
  
  
Private Sector   
  
Public Sector   
  
Public Sector 
Excluding public sector 
financial institutions 
  
  Level  Level %  Level %  Level % 
  
                      
Q3 1999 2,293,000   1,746,600 76.2%   546,000 23.8%   546,000 23.8% 
Q3 2000 2,355,000   1,807,000 76.7%   548,200 23.3%   548,200 23.3% 
Q3 2001 2,345,000   1,792,800 76.4%   552,700 23.6%   552,700 23.6% 
Q3 2002 2,352,000   1,790,500 76.1%   562,000 23.9%   562,000 23.9% 
Q3 2003 2,408,000   1,833,400 76.2%   574,100 23.8%   574,100 23.8% 
Q3 2004 2,441,000   1,852,200 75.9%   588,600 24.1%   588,600 24.1% 
Q3 2005 2,456,000   1,857,300 75.6%   598,500 24.4%   598,500 24.4% 
Q3 2006 2,499,000   1,901,300 76.1%   597,800 23.9%   597,800 23.9% 
Q3 2007 2,552,000   1,956,800 76.7%   595,300 23.3%   595,300 23.3% 
Q3 2008 2,552,000   1,957,000 76.7%   594,900 23.3%   594,900 23.3% 
Q3 2009 2,507,000   1,878,700 74.9%   628,100 25.1%   589,400 23.5% 
Q3 2010 2,479,000   1,866,500 75.3%   612,400 24.7%   578,800 23.3% 
Q3 2011 2,486,000   1,896,800 76.3%   588,900 23.7%   555,200 22.3% 
 
Source:  Quarterly Public Sector Employment series, Scottish Government, Office for National Statistics 
Notes:    
1. Figures have been rounded to the nearest hundred.  Total employment has been rounded to the nearest thousand. 
2. Public sector financial institutions include Northern Rock (classified to the public sector from Q4 2007), Royal Bank of Scotland 
Group plc and Lloyds Banking Group plc (both classified to the public sector from Q4 2008). 
3. Between Q3 2010 and Q2 2011 estimates for the civil service include temporary field staff recruited to carry out the 2011 census. 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Number of people employed in the public sector in Scotland (headcount) excluding public sector 
financial institutions 
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Source:  Quarterly Public Sector Employment series, Scottish Government, Office for National Statistics 
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Local Government 
 
Table 2:   Local Government employment by local authority (headcount) Q3 207 – Q3 2011 (Not seasonally 
adjusted) 
 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011   Annual  Annual 
Quarter Q3 Q3 Q3 Q3 Q3   Change Change 
              Headcount % 
Local Authority / Joint Board 
                
Aberdeen City 11,600 11,500 9,400 8,900 8,800   -100 -0.7% 
Aberdeenshire 13,600 13,800 14,600 14,500 13,900   -600 -4.3% 
Angus 5,700 5,800 5,700 5,600 5,500   -200 -2.9% 
Argyll & Bute 5,300 5,300 5,400 5,200 4,800   -400 -7.9% 
Clackmannanshire 2,900 2,900 2,800 2,800 2,600   -200 -7.6% 
Dumfries & Galloway 8,300 8,200 8,300 8,200 7,800   -400 -4.6% 
Dundee City 8,300 8,300 8,100 8,000 7,300   -800 -9.5% 
East Ayrshire 6,900 6,800 6,700 6,600 6,500   -100 -1.6% 
East Dunbartonshire 4,800 4,900 5,000 4,900 4,300   -500 -10.5% 
East Lothian 5,000 4,900 5,000 4,800 4,700   -100 -2.9% 
East Renfrewshire 4,800 4,800 4,800 4,600 4,500   -100 -2.2% 
Edinburgh, City of 20,500 20,100 19,000 18,500 17,800   -700 -4.0% 
Eilean Siar 2,600 2,600 2,600 2,500 2,500   0 -1.6% 
Falkirk 7,900 8,000 8,100 7,900 7,400   -500 -6.8% 
Fife 22,500 22,500 22,800 22,400 21,100   -1,300 -5.7% 
Glasgow City 33,500 31,800 23,300 22,300 21,600   -800 -3.4% 
Highland 12,600 12,700 12,800 12,700 12,100   -600 -4.9% 
Inverclyde 5,200 4,800 4,800 4,600 4,400   -200 -4.3% 
Midlothian 4,600 4,700 4,700 4,800 4,600   -200 -3.9% 
Moray 4,900 5,100 5,200 5,100 4,900   -100 -2.9% 
North Ayrshire 7,500 7,500 7,300 7,100 6,800   -400 -5.1% 
North Lanarkshire 18,000 17,900 18,200 17,200 16,300   -900 -5.2% 
Orkney Islands 2,200 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,300   -100 -3.2% 
Perth & Kinross 6,000 6,100 6,100 6,000 5,900   -100 -2.0% 
Renfrewshire 9,100 8,800 8,600 8,300 7,500   -900 -10.4% 
Scottish Borders 5,800 5,800 5,700 5,700 5,600   -100 -1.7% 
Shetland Islands 3,700 3,800 4,100 4,200 4,000   -200 -5.2% 
South Ayrshire 5,700 5,700 5,600 5,600 5,300   -300 -5.1% 
South Lanarkshire 16,000 15,800 15,900 15,500 15,100   -400 -2.6% 
Stirling 4,500 4,400 4,400 4,500 4,100   -300 -7.3% 
West Dunbartonshire 6,200 6,300 6,600 6,100 6,100   -100 -1.3% 
West Lothian 8,300 8,400 8,500 8,400 7,800   -500 -6.4% 
Total Fire Joint Boards 5,700 5,800 5,800 5,700 5,600   -100 -1.5% 
Total Police Joint Boards 23,600 23,800 24,700 24,700 23,900   -900 -3.5% 
Total Valuation Joint Boards 700 700 700 600 600   0 -3.7% 
Total Regional Transport Partnerships (SPT) 700 700 700 700 600   0 -4.6% 
SCOTLAND 315,200 313,200 304,500 297,700 284,500   -13,300 -4.5% 
 
 
Source:  Joint Staffing Watch Survey, Scottish Government 
Notes:  1. Figures are rounded to the nearest hundred. 
 2. Totals may not add up to the sum of the parts due to rounding 
 3. Figures for fire service staff exclude volunteer and retained fire-fighters 
 4. There are minor adjustments to police numbers for Dumfries and Galloway and Fife 
 5. Figures for Dundee City and Falkirk reflect some transfer of staff to charitable trusts 
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contractual arrangements with other colleges and 
collaboration where each college is funded directly but with 
collaboration required. In January colleges were invited to 
apply for a share of £15 million to help pay for redundancy 
schemes to deliver staffing changes (mergers and other 
efficiency gains). Given the numbers that have already left 
the sector via voluntary agreements compulsory 
redundancies seem more likely.  
 
Reform continued in the Higher education sector. The 
publication in January of the ‘Review of Higher Education 
Governance in Scotland’ reflected some concerns as to the 
trend for some universities to be controlled by small groups 
of officials’ rather traditional bodies. Its main 
recommendations included: new legislation to set out the 
principles of governance of Scottish universities and a 
definition of academic freedom; a code of governance to be 
drafted by the Scottish Funding Council; changes to the 
membership, functions and public access to university 
courts and, somewhat topically, the abolition of bonuses for 
principals and other changes to the bodies that award pay to 
university principals. Further, and possibly more significant, 
initiatives from the Scottish Government are likely this year.  
 
Glasgow University’s experience of restructuring from nine 
academic faculties to four colleges in one year was 
recognised as being ‘over ambitious’, more so given new 
course developments, major IT developments and staff 
reductions, should be a lesson for other public agencies 
planning major organizational change.  
 
Emergency Services 
Elsewhere the pace of reform of the public sector continues 
to accelerate with the publication of proposals for a single 
Scottish police force and a similar national organisation for 
the emergency services, with the interim headquarters of 
the national police force being based at the Scottish Police 
College at Tulliallan and the new Scottish Fire and Rescue 
Service based at Perth Community Fire Station.  The speed 
of the reforms, the proposed date for the start of the new 
police force being April 2013, has raised concerns both as 
to the costs of the integration and the inevitable dislocation 
to services, and the loss of organizational knowledge and 
experience that rationalisation will bring, and the potential 
losses to local areas as functions such as purchasing are 
centralised. Newspaper reports have indicated that up to 
2,000 police support jobs could be lost, in addition to 
reductions in previous years. In recent years there has been 
a policy of the civilianisation of police forces Police staff 
(civilian staff) constitute approximately 28% of total staff and 
can be found in three main roles: corporate (27%), 
administrative and support (61%) and Operational (12%) 
(Stewart 2009:8). It is unclear from the current proposals the 
extent to which savings in operational support staff (for 
example crime prevention, custody & detention and scenes 
of crime officers together with force intelligence analysts) 
can be achieved by the rationalisation.  
 
The reform of the police service is seen as essential to 
protect and improve frontline services for local communities 
against the backdrop of severe budget restrictions, ‘by 
stopping duplication of support services eight times over 
and not cutting the provision of front line services’ (Business 
and Regulatory Impact Assessment – Police and Fire & 
Rescue Services Reform). In addition the reform is justified 
in delivering more equal access the specialist support and 
national capacity and ‘to strengthen the connection between 
services and communities at each of the 32 local authorities; 
involving many more local councillors and better integrating 
with community planning partnerships’ (Business and 
Regulatory Impact Assessment – Police and Fire & Rescue 
Services Reform).  
 
The background to the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) 
Bill and the current concerns are well summarised in a 
SPICe Briefing published 20th February 2012. 
Notwithstanding the issues of loss of organizational 
knowledge through the rationalisation process there are a 
number of governance issues, both in terms of the new 
Police Authority (appointment and membership) and 
independence. In operational terms concerns exist as to the 
role and powers of the local police commanders and their 
relationship to local authorities. It may well be that the 
current geographical divisional structures adopted by the 
current police forces will be the basis for the new local 
structures, with these being subject to less change and 
rationalisation than the current head quarters divisions. 
However, balancing local and national priorities will be 
problematic and the bill does not prescribe how local 
authorities should implement arrangements for scrutiny of 
local policing.  
 
Financial issues  of the proposed reforms have been 
discussed in the Police Reform Programme, Outline 
Business Case  September 2011 and more recently the 
issues have been summarised in a SPICe Briefing (20th 
February 2012) Financial Scrutiny Unit Briefing Police and 
Fire Reform (Scotland) Bill: Financial Memorandum.  BRIA 
estimates that a national model will deliver by year 5 gross 
recurrent efficiency savings of around £151 million, although 
in practice this figure would be reduced (Police Reform 
Programme, Outline Business Case, September 2011).The 
Business Case assumes a natural wastage rate of 3% and 
significant redundancy costs over the first five years peaking 
in year 4 at almost £34 million (see table A5 page 87). 
Potential savings are outlined in Table A1 with almost a third 
of the savings coming from the rationalisation of support 
functions, and further savings through management de-
layering, rationalised span of control and consolidation of 
resources.  It remains unclear as to whether or not these 
savings can be reduced given the previous achievements in 
savings through rationalisation, or whether more extensive 
reductions in staff numbers will be sought.
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Developments in England give some indications as to the 
areas where the new national police force may seek to 
reduce staffing costs in addition to reducing the numbers of 
police officers and police staff. In January the home 
secretary accepted a set of proposals designed to reduce 
police staffing costs in England, these included, in addition 
to the changes affecting most public sector employees ( a 
pay freeze and increased pension contributions), a two year 
freeze on officers automatically moving up pay scales and 
the abolition of special priority payments. Potentially more 
significant will be contained in the second part of the current 
review which will consider the current pay negotiating 
arrangements basic pay, career length and pensions.  
Interestingly the Police Arbitration Tribunal did not accept 
the recommendation to reduce the rate of payment for 
overtime working, nor a reduction to accept a lower on-call 
allowance.  
 
The Chancellor’s autumn statement indicated the 
introduction of a 1% cap on public sector pay following two 
years of a pay freeze and the potential 3% increase in 
employee pension contributions. Already public sector 
workers have, as a consequence of inflation, experienced a 
cut in real earnings of nearly 8%. But, continued pay 
restraint and increased pension contributions have lead a 
number of unions to suggest that this will mean cuts of up to 
15% in real terms for public sector employees by 2014/5.   
 
____________________ 
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1. Introduction 
It is now over twelve years since the restoration of 
Scotland’s parliament, after a hiatus of almost three 
centuries. Sufficient time has therefore elapsed that it is 
possible to provide some evidence on whether Scotland’s 
economy has indeed performed better under devolution. 
Thus we look at productivity, GVA per head, employment, 
and R&D to see if there has been any relative improvement 
post-1999. Having done this, two of the channels through 
which devolution may affect these variables will be 
discussed: the composition of expenditure and policy 
innovation2. This is particularly timely given that the UK and 
Scottish parliaments are currently considering proposals 
which will give further fiscal powers to the Scottish 
parliament, and the Scottish government is planning to hold 
a referendum on full independence in the autumn of 2014.  
 
2. What happened? 
In considering Scotland’s post-devolution, there is a need to 
consider what is most likely to bring long-run (sustainable) 
economic growth to the nation. According to Krugman 
(1997), in the determination of living standards, ‘productivity 
isn’t everything but in the long run, it is almost everything’. 
Similarly, Baumol (1984) states that ‘it can be said without 
exaggeration that in the long run probably nothing is as 
important for economic welfare as the rate of productivity 
growth’. Figure 1 shows our emphasis on the central role of 
productivity in determining living standards and identifies 
innovation and efficiency alongside human capital as the 
determinants of productivity. 
 
Figure 2 shows workplace productivity, measured as GDP 
per hour worked, in the different nations of the UK (and the 
G7 excluding the UK) relative to productivity in the US since 
1996. Scotland’s productivity in 2010 was 80.4% of the US 
level. This is down slightly from a figure of 80.8% of the US 
level in 1996. Throughout the period, Scotland’s productivity 
has been higher than in Northern Ireland and Wales 
(notably the Welsh position has deteriorated over time) but 
lower than in England. There is no obvious positive step-
change in productivity performance in the devolved nations 
since 1999. 
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Figure 1:  Drivers of growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  CPPR (2008) 
 
 
Figure 2: GDP per hour worked, UK and G7 countries relative to USA, 1996-2010 
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Source:  ONS Labour Productivity 
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Figure 3:  Relative (headline) GVA per head, UK regions, 1968-2010 
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Source:  Calculations based on ONS Regional Accounts 
 
Turning to a wider measure of economic well-being, Figure 
3 shows relative GVA per head of population, relative to the 
UK average, for the four nations of the UK (with England 
divided into the Greater South East3 and the rest of 
England). Scotland has been close to the UK average since 
1968. During that period, the Greater South East has 
improved its GVA per head significantly while the rest of 
England and Wales has seen significant relative falls in their 
GVA per head. Since 1999, Scotland has managed to raise 
its GVA per head, relative to the UK average, so it has now 
almost reached parity with the UK average. However, as 
Figure 3 shows, there is still a large gap between Scotland 
and the Greater South East, although improvement has 
been seen relative to the rest of England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland. 
 
Following the approach of Harris and Trainor (1999), 
whether there has been any greater convergence or 
divergence post-devolution can be tested econometrically 
using the following equation: 
  
tttCSCtCSC devttyyyy HJJPM  '  *)()( 211
                                                                        (1) 
where ySC and yC are GVA per capita in Scotland and a 
comparator, respectively; ȝ is an intercept; t is a time trend; 
and devt is a dummy variable that takes the value of one 
from 2002 onwards (i.e. the period post-devolution)4. The 
dependent variable is therefore measuring the change in the 
gap between GDP per capita for Scotland and a comparator 
region (3 different comparators are used below). The 
parameter J1 measures whether the gap between Scotland 
and the comparator region is trending upwards or 
downwards over time5  and  J2 indicates whether this trend 
(if it exists) has accelerated or decelerated since devolution.  
 
Reflecting what is seen in Figure 3, Table 1 shows that 
when the comparator used is the UK (either excluding the 
Greater SE or just excluding the Continental Shelf), there is 
evidence of a small, but significant, acceleration in the rate 
of convergence since devolution (when the latter is 
measured post-2001)6. When the comparator is Greater SE, 
the devolution time trend is not significantly different from 
zero. However, the inability to reject the null (H0: M) that the 
lag of the gap in GVA per capita between Scotland and the 
comparator region is not different from zero suggests that 
there is no equilibrium relationship between the two series 
(so the above results regarding the devolution trend need to 
be interpreted with caution)7.  
 
A further measure of Scotland’s absolute and relative 
improvement in welfare/growth is the level of employment.  
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Table 1:  Estimated parameters from model of convergence 
 
 
Comparator: UK excluding Greater South EastUK excluding Continental Shelf Greater South East
Constant 0.0119**
(0.0047)
0.0048 
(0.0045)
-0.0058 
(0.0140)
(Scotland GVA – Comparator 
GVA)t-1 
-0.1551
(0.0851)
-0.1131
(0.0718)
-0.1079
(0.0780)
Trendt -0.0000
(0.0002)
-0.0004** 
(0.0002)
-0.0009***
(0.0003)
Devolutiont u Trend 0.0003**
(0.0001)
0.0003** 
(0.0002)
0.0003 
(0.0003)
No. of Observations 42 42 42
 
 
Note:  Standard errors in parenthesis. **/*** significant at 5/1% level based on standard t-test. 
 
 
Figure 4:  Employment levels (1999q4=1), employed and self-employed, 1999-2010  
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Figure 5:  UK Employment levels (1999q4=1), employed and self-employed, 1999-2010 (Public 
administration, defence, health and education - PHD - sector versus non-PHD sector)  
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Source:  Labour Force Survey 
 
Figure 6: R&D spending per unit of GVA relative to UK figure, 1995-2010 
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Figure 4 shows the trend in employment across the different 
nations of the UK (with England split into London and the 
rest of England) since the last quarter of 1999. All nations 
have higher employment than at the beginning of the period 
with Northern Ireland achieving the most remarkable rise in 
employment. Scotland also performed relatively well until 
2009. However, the rebound in employment after the 
recession has been far smaller in Scotland than in other 
parts of the UK which means that, over the period as a 
whole, Scotland has only performed better than the rest of 
England. 
 
Figure 5 shows that, when the employment figures in Figure 
4 are disaggregated into two broad sectors (public 
administration, defence, health and education – labelled 
PHD from now on – versus all other industries)8, then, in all 
parts of the UK, most of the rise in employment is 
attributable to the PHD sector. In Scotland, Wales and 
London, aggregate employment growth would have been 
non-existent or negative, had this sector not expanded. This 
is clearly a worrying finding given that such employment 
growth in the PHD sector is more likely to be stagnant or 
negative in the near future, because of the current UK 
government’s commitment to cuts in public expenditure. 
 
Figure 6 shows R&D expenditure per unit of GVA relative to 
the UK average for selected UK regions9. This is important 
as R&D is a key determinant of productivity (see, e.g. Harris 
& Moffat, 2011). Among the selected regions, Scotland’s 
R&D performance has improved slightly since 1995 but has 
remained relatively poor. Of the selected regions, only 
Yorkshire & Humberside and Wales had lower R&D 
expenditure per unit of GVA in 2010. To the extent that R&D 
is a leading indicator of future performance, this is a 
worrying finding. Note: these R&D figures are based on 
information covering the most important R&D spending firms 
in the UK; thus they are likely to underestimate R&D 
spending by smaller firms. Table 2 presents nationally 
representative data from a different source, showing 
Scotland (and to a lesser extent Wales) to have the smallest 
proportion of firms innovating and/or conducting R&D10. 
 
One argument for devolution is that it allows budgets to be 
spent in accordance with local preferences (cf. the literature 
on fiscal federalism, especially Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972). 
One way of testing this hypothesis is to look at whether 
there have been changes in the composition of expenditure 
since devolution. This can be done with data from the ONS 
Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses and using the 
following model: 
it
d
t
d
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d
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1
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0
                                                                             (2) 
where spendingit measures the proportion of expenditure 
going to a given area of expenditure in region i at time t, 
 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one from 
1999 onwards in devolved region d; timet is a time trend that 
shows how expenditure has grown in the non-devolved 
regions of the UK (i.e. the regions of England). The 
coefficient on  is of greatest interest as it 
shows whether the percentage point increase (decrease) in 
expenditure has been faster (slower) in devolved region d 
and therefore provides a measure of the degree of policy 
heterogeneity11.  
d
itdev
t
d
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However, it must be acknowledged, that this method will not 
necessarily capture policy heterogeneity because 
differences in policy do not necessarily require changes in 
expenditure (the same amount can be spent, but spent on a 
different ‘mix’ of underlying services captured by the 
aggregate figures). Furthermore, given that a large 
proportion of spending is on wages, which will increase or 
decrease at the same rate across the UK, looking for 
variation in expenditure totals may be a very strict test of 
policy heterogeneity. 
 
The results from estimating equation (2) by OLS 
regression12, for those areas in which the majority of 
expenditure is under the control of the Scottish government, 
are given in Table 3. Taking health as an example, the 
coefficients can be interpreted as follows (taking each in 
turn): at the start of the period, on average 18.3% of 
identifiable expenditure went towards health across the 
English regions; there was no significant difference in the 
amount of identifiable expenditure going towards health in 
Scotland at the start of the period; health expenditure in 
England has growth by 0.4 percentage points per year since 
1999; health expenditure in Scotland has grown by 0.1 
percentage points less (i.e. 0.3 percentage points) than in 
England over the period. This latter we can take as 
evidence of policy heterogeneity in Scotland. 
 
It is reasonable to expect that expenditure on enterprise and 
economic development, agriculture, forestry and fisheries, 
transport and education and training will have the most 
direct impact on economic performance (through potential 
increases in productivity). Expenditure on education and 
training, and transport, has been growing by 0.1 fewer 
percentage points, and by 0.2 more percentage points, 
respectively, in Scotland compared to England. The 
difference is positive but not statistically significant in 
enterprise and economic development and agriculture, 
forestry and fisheries. In sum, therefore, there is no clear 
indication of expenditure moving towards those areas that 
are likely to improve the performance of the Scottish 
economy in the future 
 
However, there has been little evidence of such economic 
policy innovation. Most recent economic policy documents 
(see Northern Ireland Executive, 2011; Scottish 
Government, 2007; Welsh Assembly Government, 2010) 
from the devolved nations focus on the same drivers of 
growth such as R&D, training and investment and employ 
the same type of methods to encourage them (based on 
comparable analysis undertaken at HM Treasury after 1997. 
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In doing so, they tend to follow the UK strategy documents 
(HM Treasury, 2000, 2001) 
 
Another argument for devolution is that it encourages policy 
innovation by creating inter-jurisdictional competition. 
However, there has been little evidence of such economic 
policy innovation. Most recent economic policy documents 
(see Northern Ireland Executive, 2011; Scottish 
Government, 2007; Welsh Assembly Government, 2010) 
from the devolved nations focus on the same drivers of 
growth such as R&D, training and investment and employ 
the same type of methods to encourage them (based on 
 
Table 2:  Percentage of establishments producing a product innovation or undertaking R&D, 2002-2008 
 
 
 Product innovation Blue-sky innovationa R&D 
South East 25.9 13.0 33.3 
Eastern England 25.8 12.3 32.3 
East Midlands 25.5 11.5 31.0 
South West 24.9 11.2 30.0 
West Midlands 24.1 10.9 30.6 
UK 24.0 11.1 30.8 
Yorks-Humberside 23.4 10.4 30.2 
North East  23.3 10.4 29.4 
London 23.1 11.0 30.9 
Wales 23.0 10.3 29.4 
North West 23.0 9.8 30.1 
Scotland 20.8 9.2 28.3 
 
 
a Introduction of a new product that is new to the industry (not just the firm) 
Source:  weighted data from Community Innovation Surveys, 2002-2008 
 
Table 3:  Estimates of parameters from Equation (2), 1998-2010 
 
 
Dependent 
variable - % of 
identifiable 
expenditure  
going to: 
General 
Public 
Services
Public Order 
& Safety
Enterprise &
Economic
Development
Agriculture, 
Fisheries & 
Forestry
Transport Housing & Community 
Amenities
Health
Recreation, 
Culture & 
Religion
Education & 
Training
Constant 0.015*** 0.061*** 0.015*** 0.020*** 0.033*** 0.012*** 0.183*** 0.020*** 0.160***(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Devolution u 
Scotland 
0.008*** -0.011 0.005 -0.001 -0.005 0.019*** 0.001 0.005*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
Devolution u Wales 0.006*** -0.007 0.017*** -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.009** 0.007*** -0.010**(0.001) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
Devolution u NI 0.008*** 0.048*** 0.015*** 0.013*** -0.014* 0.029*** -0.030*** -0.006*** 0.006(0.001) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
Time Trend 
0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** 0.000* 0.001*** 0.004*** -0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Time Trend u 
Devolution u 
Scotland 
-0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002** -0.001 -0.001** 0.000 -0.001**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Time Trend u 
Devolution u Wales 
0.001*** -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Time Trend u 
Devolution u NI 
0.000 -0.003*** -0.001** 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
 
Observations 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156
 
Note:  standard errors in parenthesis.  
. 
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comparable analysis undertaken at HM Treasury after 1997. 
In doing so, they tend to follow the UK strategy documents 
(HM Treasury, 2000, 2001). 
 
3.  Conclusion 
Our review of economic indicators has failed to provide any 
strong evidence of a significant impact – following the (re)-
creation of the Scottish parliament – on Scotland’s relative 
economic performance. While there has been some post 
devolution impact in terms of improved GVA per head 
relative to the UK, as shown in Figure 3 and Table 1, the 
remainder of the evidence fails to highlight why this might 
have occurred. For Wales and Northern Ireland there is 
even less to suggest devolution has resulted in any 
economic dividend. 
 
However, it ought to be acknowledged that our approach 
can be criticised on the grounds that it may be unsuitable for 
identifying a causal impact of devolution. A better approach, 
particularly in relation to productivity, would be one to 
estimate the impact of devolution at a micro-level, as that 
would allow us to control for many of the determinants of 
firm productivity (see, for example, the approach used by 
Harris and Moffat, 2011). The detailed work needed to 
undertake this approach is something we plan to do in the 
near future.  
 
____________________ 
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Endnotes 
1
 This paper is based on the presentation the Urban and Regional 
Economic Study Group on 11th January, 2012. We wish to thank 
the participants for comments, with the usual disclaimer that only 
we are responsible for the final views expressed here. 
 
2
 Identifying a causal impact of devolution on different indicators of 
economic performance is difficult. This is because of the problems 
inherent in estimating what would have happened to Scotland’s 
economy, had the Scottish parliament not been created (the 
counterfactual). As a result, in this paper, we generally rely on 
comparisons of Scotland’s performance with that of other regions 
and with its performance prior to devolution. Both have 
shortcomings as measures of what would have happened in the 
absence of a Scottish parliament because of differences in others 
factors across time, and across regions, that will affect 
performance. 
 
3
 Specifically, London, the South East and the East of England. 
 
4 We started with devt having the value of one from 1999 onwards, 
but the results were not significant for Scotland. However, as any 
policy changes will take time to fed through to changed outputs, 
then using a later start date for the dummy seems reasonable.  
 
5 A negative (positive) sign indicates that the gap is getting larger 
(smaller). 
 
6 Results (not shown here) for Wales and Northern Ireland never 
show any evidence of convergence or divergence, even when (to 
give devolution a fairer chance of working) we have experimented 
by setting devt to later years. 
 
7
 Note, the t-values obtained from the analysis must be compared 
to the Dickey-Fuller distribution, and not the Student’s t-distribution. 
 
8 Note, the first broad sector (public administration, defence, health 
and education) mostly comprises employment in the public sector 
(some 77% of total employment in 2010.q3 was in the public sector 
based on data from the ONS series “Public Sector Employment 
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Statistics”). Thus overall, most jobs depend directly on public sector 
spending. 
 
9R&D spending in Northern Ireland rose significantly in 2009-2010. 
Part of the reason seems to be a significant increase in spending by 
the aerospace industry in the Province.  
 
10Similar data for is available for Northern Ireland (but was not 
available here). 
 
11It may be thought unlikely that any significant policy heterogeneity 
will emerge immediately after the creation of the devolved bodies. 
To allow for a delayed impact of devolution, we experimented by 
changing the definition of to being a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one from 2000, 2001 and so on onwards in 
devolved region d. Using 2000 to 2003, there was little impact on 
the results for Scotland but using 2004 onwards a larger number of 
the coefficients on the became statistically 
significant although their magnitude remained small. This implies 
that it took a lengthy period of time for the Scottish Parliament to 
begin to deviate from UK spending priorities. 
d
itdev
d
itdev u ttime
 
12This method is not strictly applicable in the current situation 
because the dependent variable is bounded between 0 and 1. 
However, it has the advantage of providing results that are easy to 
interpret. 
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Should housing 
benefit be devolved to 
Scotland1 
 
Kenneth Gibb and Mark Stephens 
University of Glasgow 
 
 
 
Introduction  
In the on-going debates about additional financial powers for 
the Scottish Parliament, fiscal autonomy and indeed the 
independence referendum and the ‘devolution max’ 
alternative, giving Scotland powers over all or some aspects 
of social security is, for many, a Rubicon-crossing decision; 
a point of no return. However UK Government’s welfare 
benefit reforms in general and the cuts to Housing Benefit in 
particular have given this issue urgency. The Holyrood 
Committee examining the Scotland Bill and debates in the 
chamber have questioned the absence of Scottish powers in 
areas, such as housing, where a reserved policy (such as 
Housing Benefit) limits the ability of the Scottish Parliament 
to determine the outcome of devolved policy areas (such as 
housing). In the election campaign, the SNP manifesto said 
that the party would seek the devolution of Housing Benefit. 
 
In this exploratory paper, we look at the prospects for 
devolving Housing Benefit within the existing settlement (i.e. 
with the rest of social security reserved) and also in terms of 
a devolution max variant wherein the rest of the social 
security system is also devolved. However, in order to fully 
grasp the possibilities and challenges facing such policy 
reform, it is important to first set out how the Housing 
Benefit system works and interacts with both income 
maintenance and housing policies. This reveals important 
structural problems with the present system, ones that will 
remain unresolved by the reforms and cuts presently 
underway. 
 
The context for devolving benefit 
 
The current system 
Housing Benefit is nested within and essential to the present 
working of means-tested benefits within the reserved UK 
system of social security. Eligibility is limited to tenants, but 
extends to both those who are in or out of work (subject to a 
means-test). 
 
It fulfils two essential functions: 
 
x income maintenance: Housing Benefit is designed 
to protect incomes after rents to ensure that 
households can purchase sufficient other 
necessities; 
 
x affordability: Housing Benefit limits the burden of 
housing costs to some households so that they do 
not absorb a disproportionate amount of the 
household budget. 
 
It is this ambiguity between the housing policy objectives 
and those of income maintenance that sets the UK system 
apart from its continental counterparts and is at the heart of 
many of its difficulties. The income maintenance objective 
became more explicit in the system introduced in 1988. It 
explains why (in principle) Housing Benefit can pay the 
whole of someone’s rent and why (in principle) a rent 
increase in its entirety can be met by it. 
 
Such policy dualism also helps to explain why it has been 
difficult to reform (Stephens, 2005). The UK housing lobby 
has often been drawn to other European housing allowance 
models where, to simplify, less generous targeted 
allowances have operated alongside more generous 
systems of social security and pensions (see: Kemp, editor, 
2007). The UK is unique in making no allowance for housing 
costs within its mainstream social security benefits.  
 
Looking at the system’s details, eligible council tenants 
receive rent rebates, which are operated as deductions from 
their rents. They are directly applied to the individual rent 
statements of tenants by the council, which also administers 
the system. An assumption is made in the financial 
settlement for the Scottish Parliament each year relating to 
average rent increases and their consequent impact on the 
Rent Rebate bill, which is an explicit part of the Parliament’s 
public spending block. Eligible housing association tenants 
receive a rent allowance, which, for virtually all intents, is the 
same system from the point of view of tenants, though it is 
not controlled fiscally in the same way and has no direct 
implications for the Scottish Block.  Private tenants are, 
however, treated differently through the Local Housing 
Allowance system (see below).  
 
The general position for a social (council or housing 
association) tenant in terms of eligibility is that, provided 
their rent is less than or equal to their eligible housing cost 
ceiling, they will have all of their rent met by Housing Benefit 
if their assessed weekly income is less than or equal to the 
their assessed need for their household circumstances (the 
applicable amount of the income support scheme, modified 
for Housing Benefit purposes – e.g. employing assumptions 
about the levels of savings allowed). Should their income 
rise above the assessed need threshold, there is a 65 pence 
reduction in Housing Benefit for every pound that income 
exceeds the applicable amount (until it falls to zero).  
 
Housing Benefit thus prevents eligible rents from taking 
incomes below social assistance (e.g. JSA, IS, Pension 
Credit) levels and this implies that rising rents will be fully 
met provided they remain within eligible housing cost limits.  
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At the same time, rising rents will draw more households 
into eligibility. This is reinforced by the practice of the great 
majority of housing association landlords receiving Housing 
Benefit directly from the administrating local authority rather 
than via the tenant. This practice of ‘Rent Direct’ ensures 
rent/benefit payments reach the landlord and helps to 
reduce the incidence of arrears but it also further 
disconnects the tenant from the responsibility for meeting 
their housing costs. 
 
There are further complexities. Eligible recipients receive 
‘earnings disregards’ that do not count as assessed income 
in order to encourage work. Second, adult children or other 
non-dependents living in a larger household are assumed to 
make a contribution to the rent. Thus eligible rent is reduced 
through ‘non-dependent deductions’, so reducing Housing 
Benefit.  Third, the system discourages young people (aged 
under 26) from living independently by setting a Housing 
Benefit ceiling (the ‘single room rent’) as if they lived in 
bedsit accommodation with shared facilities. 
 
Eligible private tenants receive the Local Housing 
Allowance. LHA sets standard eligible rents at the median 
market rent for broad market rental areas for different sizes 
of properties. In principle, where an eligible private tenant 
received that allowance, and if rents are less than the 
allowance, the claimant could keep part of the difference (up 
to £15) – thereby rewarding shopping around for value. But 
if the actual rent comes out above the median, the tenant 
would have to pay the difference. If a tenant’s 
circumstances and hence income changes, this will be 
reflected in eligible Housing Benefit in the same way as with 
social tenants. The other key feature of the Local Housing 
Allowance is that apart from those tenants deemed to be 
vulnerable and those already in arrears, the benefit takes 
the form of a cheque or bank transfer to tenants – there are 
no direct payments to landlords.  
 
The scale of housing benefit 
Measured in cash terms, GB Housing Benefit was £11.65 
billion in 2000-2001 and rose to £17.50 billion in 2008-09. 
The estimated outturn figure for 2009-10 was £20.44 billion 
and the planned figure for 2010-11 was in excess of £22 
billion (Pawson and Wilcox, 2010, Table 114).  This 
increase in cost and the threat of further increases explains 
the priority that government benefit cuts focused on Housing 
Benefit immediately after the formation of the Coalition. 
 
The caseload evidence suggests a significant fall in rent 
rebate cases (from 2.1 million in 2001 to 1.5 million in 2010 
for GB) compared with a near doubling in rent allowances 
(from 1.7 million to 3.2 million across the same period - 
Pawson and Wilcox, 2010, Table 115a). Further 
disaggregation of the rent allowance data between housing 
associations and private rented housing confirms large 
caseload growth for both (not quite doubling between 2001 
and 2010) with the association caseload still slightly larger. 
The reduction in the number of rent rebate recipients and 
increase in housing association recipients reflects the 
transfer of council stock to associations. 
 
This shift also occurred in Scotland, where the rent rebate 
caseload fell from 214,000 in 2001 to 151,000 in 2010, 
whereas rent allowances increased from 92,000 to 186,000 
in the same period (Pawson and Wilcox, 2010, Tables 115b 
and 115c). The Scottish Government (2011) also report 
(pp.10-11) that the largest single group receiving HB are the 
over 65s (which is otherwise flatly distributed by age). 
Nearly 2 in 3 recipients are single people without 
dependents but almost one in five are single parent 
households. Only 6% are couples with dependent children. 
Although it is difficult to be precise, it appears that current 
annual expenditure on Housing Benefit in Scotland is of the 
order of £1.6-1.8 billion (author calculations). 
 
Benefit cuts and the universal credit 
The debate about devolving Housing Benefit’s future is not 
primarily constitutional but rather the result of the dramatic 
changes to benefits underway as a result of the policies of 
the UK Government (though politically this has clear 
constitutional bearing). The Housing Benefit cuts fall into 
two categories: those that will affect the private rented 
sector through changes to the Local Housing Allowance 
(LHA) and those that will impact on housing benefit more 
generally.  
 
The changes specific to the private rented sector (the LHA) 
concern: 
 
x Originally planned by the Labour Government, the 
removal of the £15 excess i.e. tenants will no 
longer be able to keep the difference or savings 
made (up to £15) between actual rent paid and the 
LHA (introduced in April 2011). 
 
x The LHA calculation for eligible rent was changed 
from deriving the LHA with the 30th rather than the 
median (50th percentile) of the local rent 
distribution (introduced in April 2011) – the actual 
reduction will depend on the distribution of local 
rents. 
 
x From April 2013, the basis of annual up-rating will 
change from a proportion of actual market rents to 
the CPI. Over the past decade private rents have 
increased faster than general price inflation.  
 
x A cap or maximum was placed on LHA by room 
size – from April 2011 LHA rates were capped 
including removing the largest 5 bedroom rate and 
implying a £400 per week overall cap (i.e. the 4 
bed ceiling). 
 
x From April 2012, the coverage of the single room 
rent for single person household claimants living in 
private rented housing from under 26 will be 
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expanded to those up to 35 living alone for new 
tenants and existing tenants after review. 
 
The other main HB changes that will apply across the rented 
housing system are: 
 
x Changing the rules for non-dependent deductions, 
so that previous rent increases are now taken into 
account effectively increasing non-dependent 
deductions and thus reducing HB for such 
households from April 2011. The Scottish Local 
Government Forum against Poverty (2011) 
estimates that the cost of fully uprating these 
deductions back to 2001 will entail an average 27% 
increase in non-dependent deductions, phased in 
over three years (p.19). 
 
x From April 2013, HB for working age tenants 
deemed to be under-occupying based on a 
standard regional rate for appropriate property 
sizes. 
 
x There will be a ceiling on all HB from April 2013 
between £350-500 depending on household type. 
 
Whilst these changes are introduced, it is the Government’s 
intention that Housing Benefit should disappear among the 
working age population as it is subsumed within the 
Universal Credit. This simplification of means-tested 
assistance for the working age population is intended to 
confer responsibility on the beneficiary partly through the 
use of increased conditionality.  The Universal Credit will 
operate on a single taper of 65% of net earnings, along with 
the retention of earnings disregards. Although the 
Parliamentary Bill to introduce the Universal Credit is now 
nearing completion, it is still not clear how housing costs will 
be dealt with within it.  
 
The Government also intends to end the direct payment of 
housing-related assistance to (social) landlords. Certainly, 
the aim of the UC is to provide the tenant with a single 
integrated payment and the question remains how this might 
be moderated to help landlords with vulnerable households 
and those already in arrears (as happens with the LHA). 
Second, in the long term the DWP anticipates a move from 
housing support based on actual costs (as with the current 
way Housing Benefit works) and a move to some form of 
fixed rate charge (although this might be locally-based, as 
with the Local Housing Allowance). Certainly, it is hard to 
see how the Universal Credit can achieve its fundamental 
goals if Housing Benefit remains separate and detached. 
 
Devolving Housing Benefit 1 (Social Security 
Reserved) 
Alongside the critical political reaction in Scotland to the cuts 
in Housing Benefit2, the advent of Universal Credit might 
well seem like a suitable point at which to devolve Housing 
Benefit, and to make a ‘clean break.’ The principal attraction 
to this approach is that Scotland would be able to design its 
own housing allowance, and at the least restructure it to be 
more consistent with or supportive of other housing policies 
(and welfare policies).  
A key risk concerns future budgets for Housing Benefit and, 
related, the initial settlement of how much Housing Benefit 
the Scottish Parliament would receive on its devolution. The 
reform would necessitate a negotiation between Holyrood 
and Westminster whereby an agreed sum for Housing 
Benefit would be added to the block grant. The level of 
Housing Benefit expenditure is the product of the number of 
claimants and their eligible payments.  
 
The scale of the settlement is absolutely critical as it is a 
one-off deal that will determine the essential resource level 
open to the Scottish Government for Housing Benefit 
thereafter (unless decisions are taken to make use of other 
Block spending resources). How well Scotland did out of this 
settlement might be expected to depend on factors such as 
the point in the economic cycle at which devolution 
occurred, although this would presumably be taken into 
account during negotiations, as would any expenditure 
implications of structural change, such as the shift to up-
rating the LHA limit with CPI rather than actual market 
rents). It would seem somewhat risky to adopt devolution of 
HB in the hope of successful ‘game playing’ with the 
settlement. A much clearer position is required and this may 
become apparent as a result of the negotiations over 
Council Tax Benefit, which is being devolved to the Scottish 
Parliament mirroring ‘localism’ moves in England. 
 
However, even if a satisfactory settlement were achieved, 
risks would remain. We noted earlier that while rent rebates 
are already incorporated into the Spending Block reflecting 
the need to exert some control over local government rent 
determinations, overall, the Housing Benefit system reflects 
considerable demand-led risks. It will inevitably fluctuate in 
unanticipated ways according to economic change (e.g. 
unemployment) and demographic change (e.g. household 
formation and migration). Whilst this is a risk in any form of 
expenditure, Housing Benefit is much more difficult to 
control than many other items of expenditure.  
 
What would be the benefits of a devolved Housing Benefit 
system? In principle Scotland could design its own housing 
allowance, for example by limiting the scale of the cuts 
outlined above. But it would do so with no additional 
resources because this would imply top-slicing resources 
out of an already highly pressured Scottish Parliament 
budget and individual programmes within it. This means in 
turn that a devolved Housing Benefit operating under the 
reserved social security system with the current level of 
resources could redistribute the value of benefits within its 
current financial envelope and across current recipients. 
However, reform to Housing Benefit that involved a 
substantive redistribution between (potential) recipients 
would, given the income maintenance role that is 
fundamental to Housing Benefit, be likely to create some 
unpalatable choices. For instance, if we recall that the 
income maintenance role of Housing Benefit is to protect 
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post housing cost incomes, then it follows that a 
redistribution in favour of one type of household need will be 
at the expense of another (because of the fixed global sum 
available for Housing Benefit).  
 
This is the invidious trade-off and policy bind that any 
meaningful devolution of Housing Benefit (with the rest of 
social security remaining reserved) must confront and it is 
one that applies just as much if a Universal Credit were to 
be introduced for working age households. 
 
Overall, the devolution of Housing Benefit within the existing 
constitutional structure therefore represents a very 
significant transfer of risk to the Scottish Parliament. Legal 
autonomy over the design of Housing Benefit in these 
circumstances, given the likely long lasting constraints on 
overall available resources, would inevitably require 
unpalatable trade-offs which do not make such a move 
either likely or desirable.  
 
Devolving Housing Benefit 2 (Devolution Max) 
‘Devolution max’ has not been definitively defined. However, 
it would clearly require a significant increase in the degree 
of fiscal autonomy over domestic taxation and expenditure 
decisions (including elements of social security), whilst 
Scotland would remain part of the UK. Social protection is 
the largest single category of UK public expenditure, 
representing some 30 per cent of the total, so this would 
mark a very substantial increase in the powers of the 
Scottish Government.  
 
Such a move would appear to involve a greater transfer of 
risk to Scotland than the devolution of Housing Benefit alone 
– simply because of the scale of the budget. However, the 
disruptive potential of Housing Benefit within this framework 
would be commensurably smaller for two reasons. First, 
Housing Benefit would be part of a larger social security 
budget [for the UK, according to Pawson and Wilcox, 2010, 
Housing Benefit is about 14-15% of the total UK social 
security budget including tax credits] so variations in 
demand for Housing Benefit would have less impact on the 
total. Second, the revenue base would be much wider, since 
the Scottish Parliament would presumably have greater 
borrowing powers (these powers would be required in order 
to finance cyclical deficits), as well as control over a range 
of taxes.   
 
Moreover, the potential benefits arising from autonomy is 
greater than is the case in the devolution of Housing Benefit 
alone. Within existing budgets, reforms would require trade-
offs, but these could be made across a much wider range of 
benefits and households, and would be unlikely to be as 
stark as redistribution between housing benefit claimants 
alone. 
 
The principal attraction of ‘devolution max’ is that there 
would exist the potential for a more fundamental reform of 
housing subsidies, including housing allowances, within the 
context of a reformed social security system. Whilst 
involving difficult choices, there would, for example, be the 
potential to add an allowance for some housing costs into 
mainstream social security benefits, so allowing the housing 
allowance to perform more of an affordability role. In turn 
this would allow the kind of ‘shopping incentives’ that the 
Local Housing Allowance sought to attain without such stark 
trade-offs. So eligible rents need not be based on 100% of 
actual rents, and households could be expected to carry a 
proportion of additional housing costs should they choose to 
consume more housing.  
 
Devolution Max offers the opportunity to move away from 
the present system, with its ambiguous policy aims and 
limiting constraints on the design of housing support. 
Instead the debate could move to the potential to introduce 
a more recognizable continental social security system that 
includes a general element of housing support alongside a 
tailored and more efficient housing allowance based on a 
standard charge rather necessarily being dependent on 
actual housing costs. Altering the relationship between 
social security and Housing Benefit is the only feasible way 
forward to construct a more functional set of low income 
personal housing subsidies. Only by Devolving both 
Housing Benefit alongside the remainder of the social 
security system would allow such a system to be 
contemplated. 
 
More radical reforms might include a tenure neutral system, 
with owner occupiers included in the same scheme as 
tenants. Whilst this has drawbacks (not least as ownership 
involves the acquisition of an asset though helping prevent 
mortgage default can have wider social benefits including 
stabilizing the housing market), it is a debate that should be 
had.  
 
While not underestimating the problems of benefit transition 
(for instance in securing the support of mortgage lenders 
and those providers exposed to cash flow risks from 
significant changes to housing benefit), we think that, 
Devolution Max would also allow the Scottish Government 
to examine housing subsidies across the system as a 
whole, with the ability to set both rent policies and demand 
side subsidies in a way that is frustrated by the current 
Housing Benefit system’s constraining features. It is 
inconceivable the system could be reformed radically 
without Devolution Max (unless of course the UK 
Government took the same route and then this whole 
debate would be moot).  
 
Conclusion 
The debate about devolving Housing Benefit is a multi-
dimensional one. At one level, the pursuit of effective 
housing policies suggests that current Housing Benefit 
policies are flawed structurally but reform is constrained by 
the interaction with income maintenance. Devolution Max 
offers a route to possibly fix some of these important issues. 
At a second level, the politics of the issue is in part about 
the Scottish Government’s resistance to UK Government 
cuts and is linked to the overriding constitutional question. In 
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any case, practical policy implementation of devolved 
Housing Benefit would take years, with or without 
Devolution Max. Third, the Devolution Max solution to the 
Housing Benefit/Income Maintenance integration is also a 
possible solution for the Universal Credit - incorporating a 
housing element in the UC plus adding a separate 
affordability based housing allowance (which could of 
course be regionally varied). As we hint at above, the same 
outcomes sought by devolving social security and Housing 
Benefit in Scotland could be achieved by a willing DWP at 
the UK level and could be generally consistent with the 
principles underlying the Universal Credit.  
 
 In this short paper we have not been able to cover all of this 
issues. For instance, we have not touched on the issues 
that arise if one introduces a substantively different social 
security system within one (federated) state. How will 
problems such as benefit tourism and fiscal mobility be 
addressed? In turn, do Devolution Max and Fiscal 
Autonomy make independence inevitable? 
Scottish Affairs is the definitive forum for 
comment and debate on Scottish politics, society 
and current affairs.   It is published in book form 
every quarter and is independent of political 
parties and pressure groups.  Each year, one of 
the issues focuses on a particular theme.   These 
have included: 
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